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Abstract
This paper implements frictions in financial intermediation into a small open
economy DSGE model. The model is designed to recreate key aspects of the
Chinese economy during the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing worldwide
economic contraction caused by the crisis. Simulations of external foreign
interest rate shocks show a significant reduction in the aggregate deviation from
monetary policy targets when financial intermediation is introduced. The
reduction is further enhanced when current Chinese macroprudential regulations
are taken into account. The assessment of the simulations suggests that the
Chinese financial sector and its relationship to the central bank could play a
major role in enhancing the sustainability of the current monetary policy stance
adopted by Mainland China.
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Part I
Introduction
By including frictions in financial intermediation in a model with Chinese
characteristics, this paper finds that the frictions significantly lessen the impact
of external foreign interest rate shocks. The overall deviation from domestic
monetary policy targets is less severe when frictions in financial intermediation
are present in the model simulation. Domestic monetary policy targets are
chosen with the goal to reflect policy priorities of the Chinese central bank. The
resilience towards foreign interest rate shocks further increases when existing
Chinese banking sector regulation is implemented. This conclusion is drawn from
the comparison of the simulation results of DSGE models with and without
financial intermediation. The models are constructed with the aim to replicate
key features of the economy of Mainland China between 2008 and 2012. They
are derived from the model with Chinese characteristics published by Chang et
al. in 2012.1 Similar to Chang et al., this paper simulates an external foreign
interest rate shock in different models to assess the impact on domestic monetary
policy targets.
At its core this paper explores the question, if the existence of frictions in
financial intermediation and the implementation of macroprudential regulation
changes the assessment of the sustainability of a fixed exchange rate regime in
the event of external foreign interest rate shocks. How do the frictions impact the
way in which sterilizing interventions are transmitted by the financial sector into
the real economy? How does the implementation of macroprudential regulation,
namely substantial minimum reserve requirements, shape the effect of foreign
interest rate shocks on the domestic economy? To date these links have not been
explored in depth through DSGE modeling, especially concerning the specific
setup of the Chinese monetary policy framework. Economic research though has
documented the use of the minimum required reserves ratio as a sterilization tool
by the Chinese central bank.2
Mainland China’s financial sector and macroprudential regulation have unique
features, that set them apart from their western counterparts. The Chinese
banking sector and its main actors evolved from the state-controlled economy of
China before its economic opening. Compared to other parts of the Chinese
economy, modernization and emancipation of the banking sector from the state is
happening at a much slower pace. Leo Goodstadt provides an extensive
1Chang et al. (2012)
2Ma et al. (2011) and Pan et al. (2012)
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description of the state of banking sector reform in a 2014 paper.3 Even after
decades of reforms, announcements of reforms and public commitments to
banking sector reforms, the relationship between the banking sector and the
different layers of government in China remains very close. A relationship that is
used by the government as an avenue to enlist the banking sector into supporting
the implementation of economic policy.4 The development of markets for
derivatives and OTC financial innovation has been relatively slow. The IMF
assesses that the Chinese financial system is still at an early stage of
development.5 China has been relatively slow to open up its financial markets to
foreign investors and competitors. The closeness to the state and the slow
development of alternative avenues of funding for businesses, heighten the
importance of bank lending and frictions in financial intermediation for an
assessment of Chinese monetary policy.
The relative dearth of funding options outside of bank lending implies that there
could be a strong impact of frictions in financial intermediation on the
transmission of monetary policy via a financial accelerator. In the aftermath of
the financial crisis of 2008, questions about the impact of financial intermediation
on the transmission of monetary policy interventions came into the spotlight of
economic research in particular concerning the modeling of policy interventions.
A main branch of this research is based around the channels through which
policy interventions, especially policy interest rate changes, are transmitted into
the real economy. In the context of the Chinese financial sector especially the
concept of a transmission of policy interventions through the credit channel is of
interest. 6 By reacting to monetary policy the banking sector shapes the way in
which policy interventions affect the real economy. Financial intermediation can
stabilize or destabilize the status quo of monetary policy. Frictions in financial
intermediation can act as a financial accelerator that amplifies the impact of
monetary shocks on the real economy. This effect can be observed for the models
simulated in this text. 7 This amplification of the effects of monetary shocks on
the real economy is documented in multiple studies. 8 In the simulated model,
the stronger real economy impact is paired with a reduction of the impact of
foreign monetary shocks on domestic monetary policy. Monetary autonomy is
compromised to a lesser degree when financial frictions and financial sector
regulations are present. Depending on the preferences of the central bank, this
can entail a reduction of the aggregated deviation from monetary policy targets.
3Goodstadt (2014)
4Goodstadt (2014) and also IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department (2012), p.12
5IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department (2012), p.6
6Bernanke (1993), p.55-60
7see table (7)
8for example Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), p.379-380
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The closeness of the banks to the state leads to the observation, that the central
bank shifts some of the costs created by the sterilization of the effects of the
persistent current account surplus onto the banking sector. Ma Guonan et al.
propose in a paper from 2011,9 that the configuration of the Chinese financial
sector is significantly influenced by the apparent shift of the costs of sterilization
from the central bank to the banking sector via changes to the minimal reserve
requirements. The central bank uses regulation - most visibly in the form of
reserve requirements - to sterilize the money supply effect of the current account
surplus.10
Starting from a modified version of the model established by Chang et al., the
paper presents a sequence of DSGE models. These models introduce step-by-step
financial intermediation and key features of financial sector regulation in China.
A setup that allows an assessment of the impact of each newly introduced
mechanic on the shock responses of the model variables. Accordingly the paper
can not only show the overall impact of financial intermediation and regulation
on the sustainability of the monetary policy path but also allows for comparisons
between a model without intermediation, one with intermediation and a model
with intermediation and regulation characteristic to Mainland China. A second
sequence of iterations of the model is introduced to explore the impact of
financial intermediation on the assessment of the optimal development path of
the monetary policy regime. For this a model with an open capital account, a
model with a floating nominal exchange rate and a model where both, capital
account liberalization and floating exchange rate are implemented, is simulated.
The paper is structured as follows. The first part provides important background
information that has shaped the configuration of the models. It showcases the
theoretical framework and highlights important related research. The part
furthermore gives an introduction into key aspects of Chinese monetary policy
and its development in response to the worldwide financial crisis of 2008. The
second part of this paper describes the step-by-step construction of the DSGE
models and their different characteristics. It shows the impulse responses of these
different models to an exogenous foreign interest rate shock and provides an
assessment of the occurring deviation from policy targets. The paper concludes
with the third part. This part sums up the results of the different simulations
and draws conclusions. Additional figures, schematics and the log-linear
equations of the different models can be found in the appendix.
9Ma et al. (2011), p.6-7
10Ma et al. (2011), p.6
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Part II
Research context and Chinese monetary
policy
This chapter introduces the two foundations of the present thesis. The chapter
starts with a brief description of the concepts of frictions in financial
intermediation and sterilization. It also highlights related research publications,
that have shaped the conception of the present paper. The second part of this
chapter gives an introduction into key aspects of Chinese monetary policy and
showcases important developments of the Chinese monetary policy during the
worldwide financial crisis.
1 Related research and theoretical background
The following section describes the concept of monetary policy transmission
channels and the importance of frictions in financial intermediation and gives an
overview on related research. It also provides an introduction on the concept of
the sterilization of monetary interventions and related research. The section is
divided in two parts, where the first is concerned with monetary policy
transmission and the second part is dedicated to sterilization.
1.1 Frictions in financial intermediation
The bankruptcy of the Lehmann Brothers Bank in September 2007 and the
ensuing collapse of the market for mortgage-backed securities did not only cause
worldwide economic turmoil, it also shook up economic research. Especially for
economic research concerned with the workings of monetary policy. The financial
crisis originated from the financial sector and policy actions taken as a response,
during the crisis and in the post-crisis effort, included monetary policy
interventions in a quite important way.11 The economic downturn following the
crisis not only originated in the financial sector, but it were the developments in
the financial sector during and after the initial crisis and the scope of the
economic contraction, that distinguish the financial crisis from previous economic
recessions since the Second World War.12 Government intervention, in particular
the intervention of central banks, chartered new grounds in scale and scope.13
11Friedman (2013), p.1
12Friedman (2013), p.2
13Friedman (2013), p.2
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The post-crisis effort saw the implementation of so called unconventional
monetary policy by central banks. Policies implemented to stabilize the banking
sector, through the enlargement of the classes of assets that were accepted by the
central bank as collateral and through targeted purchases of assets, specifically
mortgage-backed securities by the central bank. The policies were also
implemented to solve the conundrum of the inability of conventional monetary
policy to further influence markets, when the lower bound of zero for the policy
interest rate is reached.14
These developments brought the financial sector and its role in the transmission
of monetary policy in the limelight of economic research. Specifically since
standard macroeconomic models, and even models used by central banks for
policy decisions,15 were not equipped to model or give answers on the effect of
unconventional monetary policy and the role of financial intermediation in the
transmission of policy interventions.16 Accordingly researchers set themselves to
explore the workings of financial intermediation and in particular the
implications of a variety of frictions inherent to the information asymmetries in
financial intermediation.17
The impact of frictions in financial intermediation on the transmission of
monetary policy and the different channels through which monetary policy could
be transmitted had already been discussed before the crisis, most notably by Ben
S. Bernanke in several publications.18 The discussion of the financial crisis
sparked a new wave of research. This new research explores the impact of
financial frictions on the assessment of the optimal monetary policy, expanding
on Bernanke’s earlier work. One aspect of this research is the implementation of
frictions in financial intermediation and unconventional monetary policy into
DSGE models. This implementation can be roughly divided in two branches.
One branch that is primarily concerned with the effect of frictions on the
response to monetary policy interventions, and one branch that aims at providing
a framework for the exploration of the effects of unconventional monetary policy.
Well cited proponents of both branches are on one hand a contribution to the
Handbook of Monetary Economics from October 2009 by Mark Gertler and
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki on financial intermediation and credit policy in business cycle
analysis and on the other hand a 2011 paper by Mark Gertler and Peter Karadi
that provides a model of unconventional monetary policy.
The present thesis locates itself in the branch of papers that explore the effects of
frictions in financial intermediation on the response of the model to monetary
14Friedman (2013), p.3-4
15see for example the NAWM published by the ECB Christoffel et al. (2008)
16Friedman (2013), p.2-3
17Friedman (2013), p.3
18Bernanke (1993), Bernanke (1995) and Bernanke et al. (1999)
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shocks and monetary policy interventions. A wide array of different approaches
has been employed to explore the implications of financial frictions on monetary
policy transmission. A common approach is localization, meaning the
introduction of features specific to a country or region into the model
configuration. Localization allows for the assessment of the impact of frictions in
the context of a specific country. One subject of such localization is Mainland
China. Several papers have taken a closed-economy approach at assessing
questions of monetary policy transmission and the financial sector in China. This
is for example a 2012 paper by Chen Qianying, Michael Funke and Michael Paetz
and a follow up paper by Michael Funke and Paetz also published in 2012, that
evaluate initiatives and proposals concerning the reform of China’s financial
system. Another paper by Michael Funke, Petar Mihaylovski and Haibin Zhu
from 2015 looks at the implications for monetary policy and policy reform arising
from the existence of a shadow banking sector.
Another angle is to expand on the financial sector and to implement interbank
markets and frictions in interbank markets into the model to assess the
implications. Papers concerned with this angle, that have also strongly
influenced the model configuration in the present thesis, are a paper by Ali Dib
from 2010 exploring the impact of interbank and credit market frictions, and a
similar approach is used by Bjo¨rn Hilberg and Josef Hollmayr in their 2013 paper
on asset prices in the interbank market and unconventional monetary policy.
Optimal monetary policy, the effect of macroprudential regulation when frictions
are present and the use of countercyclical interventions by the central bank have
all been the subject of a variety of different papers. Amongst them a 2013 paper
by Leonardo Gambacorta and Frederico M. Signoretti exploring the question if
monetary policy should pursue countercyclical interventions. As well as
Pierre-Richard Age´nor and Luiz A. Pereira da Silva, who discuss the implications
of macroprudential regulations on monetary policy transmission in a model with
financial frictions, lastly a 2011 paper by Marion Kolasa and Giovanni Lombardo
on the optimal monetary policy in an open economy with financial frictions.
A The financial accelerator and monetary policy transmission channels
Financial intermediation plays an important role when looking at the impact of
monetary policy interventions on the real economy. Financial intermediation
serves as an intermediary between monetary policy and the real economy. And
because of this role as a middle man, it can alter the way in which monetary
shocks and policy interventions are transmitted to the real economy. The extent
of this alteration is dependent on the configuration of the financial sector and the
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existence of frictions in financial intermediation.19
Financial intermediaries play a central role in credit markets. Due to their
specialization in financial markets, intermediaries invest with an informational
advantage over other non-specialized market participants. Their expertise allows
them to function as a link in the allocation of savings from relatively uninformed
investors to uses that are hard to evaluate and need intensive information and
monitoring.20 This allows them to create access to credit for borrowers who
would otherwise be unable to obtain external funding. Given this special role,
interference with the amount of credit channeled through financial
intermediation can be assumed to create noticeable macroeconomic effects. Such
interference would stem from bank runs and panics, government restrictions,
increased costs, declines in the bank’s capital or deposit base and monetary
policies that affect the stock of bank deposits.21
In a paper from 2002, Bean et al. identify three distinct channels through which
monetary policy may be transmitted into the real economy. The interest rate
channel, the bank lending channel and the broad credit channel. Of these three
only the interest rate channel is not conditional on the existence of financial
intermediation.22 In the following paragraphs the interest rate channel and the
broad credit channel are discussed in greater detail.
The interest rate channel is based on the assumption, that changes in nominal
interest rates have an effect on the real economy. A link is assumed between
interest rates and the relative prices in the economy. Under the condition of price
rigidity this spills over into the real economy. The link primarily affects the price
for capital and the price for future consumption in terms of present consumption.
Higher interest rates provide an incentive for higher savings, while lower interest
rates favor present consumption. The channel implies a causal link between
movements in short term nominal interest rates and movements in short and long
term real interest rates. A link that is then transmitted to real variables and
inflation. This is conditional on a slow responsiveness of inflation. This slow
responsiveness is brought about by the existence of nominal rigidities in prices
and wages.23
The basic concept behind the interest rate channel can also be applied to a
situation, where controlling the money supply growth is the main instrument of
monetary policy. An increase in the money supply creates an inflationary push,
that affects the price of future consumption in terms of present consumption.
This leads to higher nominal interest rates, prices and wages. With price rigidity,
19Beck et al. (2014), p.1-2
20Bernanke (1993), p.51-53
21Bernanke (1993), p.53
22Bean et al. (2002), p.12-13
23Bean et al. (2002), p.14
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this spills over into the real economy as an expansionary impulse.
The broad credit channel assumes the existence of an external finance premium.
The premium captures the difference in cost that entrepreneurs face when
sourcing funds for investments. A difference exists between funds that are raised
externally and internally generated funds. This premium on external funds
reflects the imperfections in credit markets. It is the result of frictions in the
process of financial intermediation. These frictions can stem from the asymmetry
in information between borrower and lender and the costs associated with the
enforcement of contracts. The premium reflects the dead-weight costs associated
with the principal-agent problem inherent to the relation between borrower and
lender. It encompasses the lender’s expected costs for the evaluation, monitoring
and enforcement of debt contracts.24 The premium a borrower faces is assumed
to be conditional on the borrower’s financial position. The greater the sum of the
borrower’s liquid assets and marketable collateral, dubbed the borrower’s net
worth by Bernanke,25 the lower the premium levied for external financing. A
stronger financial position reduces the potential conflict of interest between
borrower and lender leading to a reduction of the premium. By this, the
borrower’s balance sheet has a direct impact on its investment and spending
decisions. The overall terms of credit affect investment and spending decisions,
creating the ’financial accelerator’ effect.26 The borrower’s balance sheet
improves with the economic conditions, leading to a decline in the external
finance premium. This increases the borrower’s spending and enhances economic
growth. There is mutual feedback between the financial and real sectors.27 The
financial accelerator influences economic conditions by causing variations in the
entrepreneurs’ cost of capital in line with the financial health(net worth) of
entrepreneurs. This effect is more pronounced when the terms of debt contracts
are renegotiable.28 The existence of an accelerator amplifies the impact of
monetary shocks on the real economy and the real economy impact of monetary
policy interventions. A reduction of the nominal policy rate for example
suppresses market interest rates, reducing the cost for external funds. This would
reduce the amount of external funding needed by the entrepreneurs, leading to a
higher stake of the entrepreneur in their project. This in turn reduces the
external finance premium, further reducing the external financing costs. Through
this amplification the effect of monetary intervention on the domestic economy is
stronger than it would have been in the absence of financial frictions.29
24Bernanke (1995), p.10-11
25Bernanke (1995), p.3
26Bernanke (1995), p.12
27Friedman and Woodford (2010), p.4
28Bean et al. (2002), p.20
29Bernanke (1995), p.12-13
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1.2 Sterilization of foreign exchange intervention
Interventions of central banks on domestic money markets that aim at
neutralizing the money supply effects of preceding foreign exchange market
interventions, have been a subject of economic research for a long time. In the
context of ad hoc foreign market interventions, that aim at mitigating short-term
fluctuations in exchange rates or that attempt to influence longer-term
movements.30 As well as in the context of the constant foreign exchange market
activity in the presence of a fixed exchange rate regime. Maurice Obstfeld
describes sterilization as an attempt by the central bank to divorce foreign
exchange interventions from domestic money supplies through offsetting
operations on domestic financial markets.31
Research on sterilization revolved around a variety of aspects in the last decades,
for the present paper three aspects are of particular interest. The first aspect is
research that concerns itself with foreign exchange interventions, their
subsequent sterilization and the question if sterilization can be efficient and what
costs are associated with it. The second aspect is the role that sterilization and
the accumulation of foreign reserves associated with current account imbalances
play in the new global financial architecture that emerged at the beginning of the
second millennium.32 The third aspect is the sustainability of the exchange rate
regime chosen by the People’s Republic in light of the mid- to longer-term ability
to sterilize the persistent current account surpluses.
Literature that has formed the conception of the present thesis that falls under
the first aspect is a paper by Richard T. Baillie and William P. Osterberg, that
examines the reasons for interventions by central banks into foreign exchange
markets for the Dollar/DM and Dollar/Yen exchange rates, exploring the reasons
for interventions by central banks on foreign exchange markets in floating
exchange rate regimes. A similar subject is examined by Kathryn M. Dominguez
and Jeffrey A. Frankel, whose 1993 paper is concerned with the efficiency of
foreign exchange interventions by central banks. The relative effectiveness of
sterilized and non sterilized foreign exchange market interventions is the subject
in a 2005 paper by Keith Pilbeam. The costs associated with sterilization are the
subject of a 1991 paper by Guillermo A. Calvo. Using a general equilibrium
monetary portfolio choice model of a small economy, Michael Kumhof’s 2010
paper examines the theory of sterilized foreign exchange intervention, lastly a
2007 paper from Pierre L. Siklos and Diana N. Weymark that uses evidence from
emerging markets as well as Hong Kong, Korea, Japan and Singapore to asses
the effectiveness of sterilized foreign exchange intervention.
30Genberg (1981), p.451
31Obstfeld (1982), p.1-2
32Aizenman et al. (2010b), p.616-617
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Concerning the discussion of global imbalances and their relation with
sterilization, the present thesis has been mostly informed by series of papers from
Joshua Aizenman and Collaborators, starting with a 2008 paper from Aizenman
on the reasons for the accumulation of international reserves by developing
countries, especially the so called East-Asian Tiger States. A 2009 paper by
Aizenman and Reuven Glick on the changing pattern and efficiency of
sterilization in relation to the increasing integration of emerging market
economies into the world economy. A 2010 paper by Aizenman, Menzie D. Chinn
and Hiro Ito on the financial integration of Asia in the world economy uses the
trilemma of the open economy as a measuring tool. And another paper from
2010 by Aizenman, Menzie D. Chinn and Hiro Ito that investigates the effect
different trilemma configurations have on the economic performance of
developing countries. The policy trilemma is also the subject of a paper from
2013 by Michael W. Klein and Jay C. Shambaugh, that investigates the case for
intermediate configurations of the trilemma. An intermediate configuration
would be a scenario, where capital movement has some restrictions, but is neither
completely free nor completely restricted. As well as a paper by Michael B.
Devereux, Philip R. Lane and Juanyi Xu from 2006 and a 2011 paper by
Sebastian Edwards, that both look at exchange rates in emerging market
economies. Where Devereux et al. focus on the monetary policies of emerging
market economies and Edwards on the empirical regularities found across a
variety of emerging countries.
Concerning the sustainability of the Chinese exchange rate regime two papers
have been of particular importance for the conception of the present thesis. A
2007 paper by Alice Y. Ouyang, Ramkishen S. Rajan and Thomas D. Willett
that investigates the ability of Mainland China to act as a reserves sink, the
ability of Chinese monetary policy to continue the sterilization of its increasing
foreign reserves. And a 2009 paper by Christer Ljungwall and Xiong Yi and
Yutong Zou, that investigates the costs associated with sterilization for the
Chinese central bank and the measures implemented to mitigate these costs.
A Trilemma of the open economy
The observation that the choice of a monetary policy path is subject to
restrictions, that policy makers can’t have it all, is at the root of the monetary
policy trilemma. It states that of the three ideal monetary policy configurations
(free capital mobility, a stable exchange rate and autonomous domestic monetary
policy), only two can ever be achieved simultaneously.33
33Klein and Shambaugh (2013), p.1, a detailed description can be found in Aizenman et al.
(2010b), p.617-621
10
Accordingly a commitment to a credible fixed exchange rate regime implies
forgoing either monetary autonomy or unrestricted capital mobility.34 The reason
for this is the effect of arbitrage. Without effective restrictions on the transfer of
capital across the border, investors will seek to profit from arbitrage gains and
eventually force an adjustment of interest rates to match those of the base
country. To prevent this adjustment through arbitrage and the possibility of
credit bubbles that can be created by the influx of investments seeking arbitrage
gains, the domestic financial market has to be shielded by capital transfer
restrictions from the base country. By controlling capital flows central banks
retain the autonomy to set an independent domestic monetary policy at the price
of decoupling the domestic financial markets from those of the base country.35
In consequence domestic monetary autonomy hinges on the effectiveness of the
decoupling of the domestic financial markets and the base country. Without
integration of the real economy, the central bank’s task would be confined to
enforcing capital controls. The picture changes when there is economic
integration. Decoupling the financial markets is increasingly difficult the more
the domestic economy is integrated into international markets.36 The
cross-border exchange of goods and services between economies entails a
cross-border flow of funds, that increases with further integration. By
committing to a credible currency peg, the central bank promises to provide the
currency needed for the cross-border trade at the exchange rate set by the central
bank. The central bank intervenes constantly on money markets to purchase
foreign currency from exporters and to provide foreign currency to importers.
In a scenario with a balanced current account these interventions do not impact
monetary autonomy. The central bank would acquire as many foreign currency
assets from exporters as it would need to pay for imports. More precisely, the
domestic exporters are payed in foreign currency, that they exchange with the
central bank for domestic currency and importers exchange domestic currency for
foreign currency with the central bank to pay for imports. A current account
imbalance on the other hand can infringe on monetary autonomy. Given a large
or persistent current account surplus, the central bank would acquire more
foreign currency from exporters than is needed to provide for imports. As the
central bank exchanges foreign currency for new domestic currency, the domestic
money supply grows. This provides an inflationary impulse and prompts an
increase of the domestic policy rate. Domestic monetary autonomy is
compromised. In the case of a persistent current account deficit, monetary
autonomy suffers too. The central bank balance shrinks due to the reduction of
34Edwards (2011), p.11
35Klein and Shambaugh (2013), p.1
36Aizenman (2008), p.490
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foreign assets held by the central bank. The reduction in foreign assets is coupled
with a reduction in the domestic money supply, as the central bank receives
domestic currency for the assets it sells. The domestic money supply declines,
causing deflation and prompting a decrease in the domestic policy rate. In the
current account deficit scenario the feasibility of the adopted monetary policy
has a hard limit, that may become subject to speculation. The policy will
become untenable when the central bank’s ability to provide foreign assets is
depleted. A change in policy will likely occur before this point is reached.37
Aizenman describes the phenomenon that central banks of developing nations,
especially the so called South-Asian Tiger States, tended to acquire substantial
holdings of foreign assets as a means to lean against the wind during a currency
crisis 38 thus enhancing the sustainability of the chosen policy path.
To counteract these undesired effects of current account imbalances, central
banks engage in sterilization. They intervene on the domestic financial markets
to neutralize the changes in the money supply. Thus the ability to efficiently
sterilize the change in the money supply is a key part in the sustainability of the
adopted monetary policy.
B Methods of sterilization
As stated, the goal of sterilization is to neutralize the change in domestic base
money caused by money market interventions of the central bank. This text
focuses on the use of sterilization as a tool to neutralize the adverse effects of
current account imbalances on domestic base money. In a very narrow sense,
only balance sheet neutral interventions constitute actual sterilization. The
change in foreign assets has to be matched by a change in the central bank’s
domestic asset position.
In the case of a current account surplus, the central bank sells domestic bonds
that it held to drain liquidity from the money market after a purchase of foreign
assets. This is balance sheet neutral as the increase in foreign assets is matched
by a decrease in domestic assets held by the central bank.39
In the current account deficit case, the central bank sells foreign assets to
domestic entities for domestic currency, thus reducing domestic base money. The
central bank neutralizes this reduction in base money by purchasing domestic
assets with new money, that it created. This would be balance sheet neutral, as
the decrease in foreign assets would match the increase in domestic assets on the
central bank’s balance.40
37Krugman (1979), p.319
38Aizenman (2008), p.490, Aizenman et al. (2010a), p.26
39Neely (2000), p.2-3
40Neely (2000), p.2-3
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In a less narrow definition, sterilization must not necessarily be balance sheet
neutral. Measures of the central bank can be classified as sterilization, if they
fulfill the goal of neutralizing the undesired change in base money.41 Sterilization
can be conducted through interventions that shift funds in the central bank’s
balance from base money to another liability or the other way around. A
standard procedure in the case of an increase of base money is the issuance of
bonds by the central bank. These bonds are sold for domestic currency on
domestic financial markets to reduce the liquidity of the market, thus
temporarily counteracting the increase of base money. Central banks can use
reverse repurchase agreements (reverse from the central bank’s point of view) for
the same goal. Decreasing base money can be counteracted in the short run by
entering in repurchase agreements, where the central bank lends assets against
new domestic currency.42
A less direct form of sterilization is the management of domestic money market
liquidity by the adjustment of regulatory controls. An example of this would be
the adjustment of the minimum required reserves ratio of the commercial banks.
Minimum reserves have no liquidity and an increase in the minimal reserves
requirement would drain market liquidity. Just as a decrease in the ratio would
increase liquidity. The desire to increase liquidity on financial markets is what
prompted the European central bank to lower the minimal reserve requirements
as a response to the European credit crisis. This can also be used to sterilize
base money effects of current account imbalances and may be one of the reasons
for the relatively high minimal reserve requirements in Mainland China.43
C Costs of sterilization
The ability of the central bank to sterilize depends on the costs associated with
sterilization. Central banks face two kinds of costs when considering sterilization,
balance sheet costs and policy costs. Balance sheet costs are incurred through
balance mismatches. The accumulation of foreign assets in the case of a current
account surplus will lead to losses for the central bank if foreign interest rates are
below domestic interest rates. The central bank would sterilize low paying
foreign assets by selling high paying domestic bonds or by issuing central bank
bonds with higher remuneration. The same holds in the reverse case, when the
bank reduces its holdings of high interest foreign assets in favor of domestic
assets with lower remuneration to sterilize a current account deficit.44
In addition to interest rates there is also the issue of imperfect asset substitution.
41BIS Monetary and Economic Department (2005), p.16-17
42Aizenman and Glick (2009), p.779
43Ma et al. (2011), p.5
44BIS Monetary and Economic Department (2005), p.62
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The liquidity, risk profile and payment schedule of the swapped assets may be
less desirable. This imperfect substitution becomes a higher burden the longer a
current account imbalance persists. The sterilization of the massive portfolio of
US treasury bonds acquired by the Chinese government is an imperfect
substitution, as domestic interest rates were above US rates after the financial
crisis, implying that the central bank incurs losses when sterilizing through the
issuance of bonds.45
Central banks committed to a fixed exchange rate tend to suffer policy creep.
Monetary policy is primarily dictated by what is needed to achieve and maintain
the exchange rate regime.46 Putting the exchange rate first makes monetary
policy coordination difficult and can produce inconsistent policy targets. Markets
can receive misleading or distracting signals. The need for intervention and
sterilization is put above the fulfillment of other policy targets. The central bank
misses important policy targets (domestic GDP, inflation, employment) in its
quest to maintain the given monetary policy. This can be seen as a loss of overall
welfare, as economic development does not reach the state targeted by the
central bank. 47
2 Chinese monetary policy and the financial crisis
The following section is meant as an introduction to key characteristics of
monetary policy and the financial sector in China. The characteristics identified
in this section are then revisited in the second chapter during the model-building
process. This section also contains an overview of the impact of the financial
crisis on Chinese monetary policy.
2.1 Framework of monetary policy in China
Three characteristics of the monetary policy framework in China are of
particular interest in the construction of the models. The role and scope of
central bank activity, the exchange rate regime and its implementation and the
role of capital controls and their implementation. The parts below highlight the
role of these characteristics and present some key figures.
45BIS Monetary and Economic Department (2005), p.61
46BIS Monetary and Economic Department (2005), p.2
47BIS Monetary and Economic Department (2005), p.2
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A The People’s Bank of China (PBOC)
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China,
establishes the PBOC as the central monetary authority for the People’s
Republic. The central bank is tasked to implement monetary policy, to prevent
and mitigate financial risks and to maintain financial stability.48 The objective of
monetary policy is to maintain the stability of the value of the currency and to
promote economic growth.49 Unlike other central banks, the PBOC is not
independent in the implementation of its policy targets. Its decisions concerning
the annual money supply, policy interest rate, exchange rate and other important
issues specified by the Chinese Government, are subject to approval by the
Government.50 Monetary policy is carried out in accordance with the overall
economic policy of the Chinese government. The main instrument of China’s
monetary policy framework is the control of broad money growth.51
The balance of the monetary authority reflects the effects of the monetary policy
path chosen by the Chinese government. A simplified representation is displayed
in table(1) for the quarter-end balance of the first quarter of 2008 and the fourth
quarter of 2012. The persistent current account surplus coupled with the
exchange rate regime has lead to an accumulation of substantial foreign assets by
the central bank. Foreign assets account for 80% of all assets in Q4 2012, an
increase compared to their share of 75% in 2008. The ratio of foreign assets over
currency issue remained stable at 4:1 between Q1 2008 and Q4 2012.52 The share
of government debt and other assets on the balance is persistently small - such
that balance sheet neutral sterilization is severely limited.
An important aspect of the liabilities side is the large amount of deposits of
financial corporations included in reserve money(deposit reserves). In Q4 2012
deposit reserves accounted for two thirds of all liabilities of the central bank, a
notable increase over Q1 2008, where deposit reserves made up only slightly more
than one third of total liabilities. This increase in the share of deposit reserves is
primarily an effect of the increase in the required reserves ratio. 53
Interestingly, the trend of an increasing bond issuance observed by Ljungwall et
al. for the period between 1999 and 2008, did not continue. The value of
announced bond auctions in Q4 2012 is significantly smaller than in Q1 2008.
This is not caused by a decrease in sterilization, but by a change in the method
of liquidity management by the central bank. Central bank bonds were replaced
48National People’s Congress of the PRC (2003), §2
49National People’s Congress of the PRC (2003), §3
50National People’s Congress of the PRC (2003), §5
51Ma et al. (2011), p.10 also Sun (2013), p.56-57
52Ljungwall et al. (2009), p.5
53see Ljungwall et al. (2009), p.5
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by targeted repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements as the tool of choice
for the management of financial market liquidity in 2012. Central bank bonds
pay market interest rates and are traded on the bond market, they are usually
held by financial institutions.54
Assets 2008 2012 Liabilities 2008 2012
Foreign Assets 13.7 24.1 Currency Issue 3.3 6.0
Other Assets 4.5 5.3 Deposit Reserves 7.1 19.2
Bond Issuance 3.9 1.4
Other Liabilities 3.8 2.8
Total Assets 18.2 29.4 Total Liabilities 18.2 29.4
Table 1: Simplified balance of the Chinese monetary authority in trillion RMB 55
With the financial crisis and the slowdown in global demand caused by it, the
export surplus of Mainland China has been lower in the period between 2008 and
2012 compared to the preceding years. The average of the current account
surplus for the period between 2004 and 2008 stood at 5.7% percent of GDP.
There is a significant reduction between 2008 and 2009, the surplus reached 9.2
% in 2008, but dropped to 4.8% in 2009. It stood at 3.9% in 2010, 1.8 % in 2011
and 2.5% in 2012.56 This reduced surplus is also reflected in the growth of the
foreign assets held by the central bank. The explosive increase of the pre-crisis
period decelerated, foreign assets increased on average by 37.28% between 2004
and 2008 and on average by 17.02% between 2008 and 2012 year-on-year. The
graph in figure(1) shows the total reserve assets held by the monetary authority
in US-Dollars from 2007 to 2012. The red line depicts the official holdings of US
Treasury Bonds by the Chinese government as published by the US Treasury.
The central bank uses a variety of tools to conduct monetary policy. Shu et al.
list six categories of price and quantity based market and non-market measures.
Open market operations, selective transactions, reserve requirements, benchmark
interest rates, credit controls and other regulatory means.58 Of these tools the
open market operations and reserve requirements are of particular interest, as
54Ljungwall et al. (2009), p.5
55Table according to Ljungwall et al. (2009) p.5, data from People’s Bank of China (2009) and
People’s Bank of China (2013)
56Data: Worldbank Statistical Database The World Bank (2000-2013)
57Data for the graph: People’s Bank of China (2008-2012a), U.S. Department of the Treasury
(2007-2012)
58Shu and Ng (2010), p.7 also Zhang (2009), p.473-474 on the use of price and quantity
instruments
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Figure 1: Total reserve assets of the monetary authority (black) and US Treasury
Bonds held by the Chinese Government in trillion USD 57
they are described as being used as tools for sterilization.59 Benchmark interest
rates are of particular interest because of their impact on the amount of funds
channeled by financial intermediation.
Open market operations: Open market operations encompass market-based
interventions conducted on a regular basis by the central bank. These operations
aim at controlling the liquidity of the financial markets. The OMO of the central
bank have seen a shift between 2008 and 2012. While the issuance of central
bank bonds, of which the PBOC controls the amount, price and maturity, was
the preferred method to reduce liquidity at the beginning of the period, they
were replaced by reverse repurchase agreements by 2012. Reverse repurchase
agreements announced by the central bank usually have fairly short maturities,
with the majority of agreements ranging between 7 and 14 days. Repurchase
agreements are used to add liquidity to the markets. Prior to 2013 China had no
equivalent to the standing short- and mid-term lending facilities established by
the ECB and Federal Reserve, that could provide ad hoc short-term liquidity to
banks. Meaning that the provision of short term liquidity to the banking sector
was tied to a deliberate direct intervention of the central bank. The chart in
figure(2) shows a compilation of the volume of the announced open market
operations by the central bank for the period between January 2008 and
December 2012. The shift from bond auctions to reverse repurchase agreements
is clearly visible. The announcements for the auctions of central bank bonds list
maturities ranging from 3 to 36 months. It also shows that the central bank is
providing short-term liquidity through the means of short maturity repurchase
59Ma et al. (2011), p.6
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agreements, while it is also draining liquidity in the mid- to long-term through
the auction of central bank bonds.
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Figure 2: Volume of bond auctions (black), repurchase agreements (red) and re-
verse repurchase agreements (blue) announced by the PBOC between 2008 and
2012 in billion RMB 60
Required reserves: As the high amount of deposit reserve in the central bank
balance indicates, required reserves are an important characteristic of monetary
policy in China. The requirement for depository institutions to hold a share of
their deposits as minimum reserves with the central bank is common central
bank practice. What sets the Chinese practice apart is the frequency of
adjustments to the required reserves ratio. As an answer to the financial crisis,
the ECB changed the minimum reserves ratio for the Euro-area once between
2008 and 2012, from 2% to 1%. In the same period the PBOC adjusted the
required reserves ratio 25 times, usually by an increment of 50 base points. The
60Data compiled from open market announcements of the PBOC, source: People’s Bank of
China (2008-2012b)
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ratio rose from 14.5% in December 2007 to a peak of 21.5% for large banking
institutions in June 2011.61 The requirements are not the same, they differ
according to the type of deposit and the financial institution holding them. The
reserve requirement on foreign currency deposits is lower than the requirement
on local deposits. In 2008 the PBOC has adopted a two-tier system of reserve
requirements, where the 6 or 7 largest banks persistently face higher reserve
requirements than smaller commercial banks. While rural credit cooperatives
and banks have the lowest reserve requirements.62
According to Ma et al. required reserves have become a preferred tool to conduct
sterilization for the central bank. Changes in the ratio are employed as a tool to
control the development of the money supply and to manage the liquidity of the
financial market. The importance of required reserves in sterilizing foreign
exchange interventions is visible in the high ratio of deposit reserves to foreign
assets, that stood at 63% at the end of Q4 2012. Central bank bond issuance in
contrast stood at only 6% of foreign assets. Changes in the required reserves
ratio serve as a substitute for the net issuance of central banks bonds as a tool to
drain the increases of liquidity generated by foreign exchange intervention.63
Three motivations are stated by Ma et al. as reasons for the use of the required
reserves ratio as a sterilization tool. In contrast to mostly short-dated open
market operations (especially the reverse repurchase agreements), liquidity
transferred to required reserves is removed permanently from the market until
the ratio is lowered.64 Reserve requirements are cost efficient from the central
bank’s perspective. The remuneration payed on the required reserves is set by
the central bank and independent of market trends and demand. While the
interest rate offered on central bank bonds with a one year maturity ranged
between 406 and 150 bps from January 2008 to December 2012 with a mean of
270 bps, the interest rate on required reserves changed from 189 to 162 bps in
2008 and remained stable thereafter.65 Accordingly adjustments of the required
reserves ratio can serve as a cheaper alternative to bill issuance and reverse
repurchase agreements. This implies a loss of income for the financial sector,
forcing the financial intermediates to carry more of the burden of sterilization.66
The third motivation for the use of required reserves stems from the impact
central bank bond auctions have as a means of signaling policy rate changes and
in guiding market expectations. Reserve requirements do neither and so they can
serve as tools for liquidity management that do not directly change market
61Data compiled from People’s Bank of China (2008-2012a), also Pan et al. (2012), p.229
62Ma et al. (2011), p.4
63Ma et al. (2011), p.7 and Pan et al. (2012), p.235
64Ma et al. (2011), p.9
65Data from People’s Bank of China (2008-2012a)
66Ma et al. (2011), p.9
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expectations.67
Benchmark interest rates : Unlike other central banks, the PBOC does not rely
solely on the signaling capacity of the policy interest rate to influence market
interest rates. In addition to the policy rate the PBOC also sets benchmark
interest rates on deposits and loans. These benchmark rates serve as a boundary
around which the interest rates set by the individual financial intermediaries can
float. In June 2012 the upper limit of the floating range for the deposit rate was
set to 1.1 times the benchmark rate. In the same step the lower limit of the
floating range of loan rates was limited to 0.8 times the benchmark rate on loans.
The adjustment of the benchmark rates can be assumed to reduce the necessity
for adjustments of the policy interest rate. While the ECB policy rate was
adjusted 15 times between January 2008 and December 2012, the PBOC policy
rate was adjusted once. The benchmark rates though were changed 12 times in
the same period.68 Adjustments of the benchmark rates are used as a tool of
macroeconomic management.69
B Exchange rate regime
The exchange rate regime in place between 2008 and 2012 for Mainland China
was adopted in July 2005. It was announced as a step to emancipate the
exchange rate from the USD-peg implemented before. It is referred to as a
managed floating exchange rate regime by the PBOC (’guanli de fudong huilu¨
zhidu’ in Chinese).70 The regime rests on two pillars. The first is that unlike the
preceding USD-peg, the RMB is no longer pegged to a single currency but to a
currency basket. This basket is composed of 11 different currencies, which are
seen as important to the Chinese economy. Among these currencies is the USD,
the Euro, the Japanese Yen and the Korean Won.71 The changes of these
currencies’ exchange rates relative to each other are taken as the basis for the
determination of the RMB exchange rate. Currencies in the basket are given
weights, that differ according to the relative importance of the currency for the
Chinese economy.72 The distribution of the weights is not published and most
likely subject to changes over time.73
The second pillar of the exchange rate regime is the inclusion of market demand
67Ma et al. (2011), p.9-10
68Data from People’s Bank of China (2008-2012a)
69Shu and Ng (2010), p.8
70People’s Bank of China (2005), p.1
71Frankel (2009), p.4
72People’s Bank of China (2005), p.1
73Frankel (2009), p.51
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and supply into the development of the exchange rate.74 The PBOC sets a
central parity for the RMB at the end of each trading day. The exchange rate
can then float within a band defined by the PBOC around the central parity on
the next trading day, according to market demand and supply. The floating
bands can differ between different currencies, the floating band for the USD was
changed from 50 bps to 100 bps in Q1 2012.75
C Capital controls
Mainland China maintains extensive regulation of cross-border flows. The foreign
exchange system draws a clear line between transactions under the current and
capital account.76 In tune with the increasing integration of the Chinese economy
into the global economy, transactions under the current account have seen a
substantial liberalization. Transactions under the capital account on the other
hand remain strictly regulated.77 The state administration for foreign exchange
(SAFE) has authorized financial intermediaries to engage in the onshore sale and
purchase of foreign exchange assets for transactions under the current account.
The authorized intermediaries form the market makers of the onshore foreign
exchange market.78 The SAFE sets a limit for the scope of the foreign exchange
trade of an individual intermediary.79 Transfers under the current account can be
conducted by the financial intermediaries within their allotted limits without a
separate approval of the SAFE, if a legitimate reason for the transfer exists. The
SAFE defines the necessary documentation and the limits of foreign exchange
transfer.80 The restrictions of transfers under the capital account are much
stricter. Direct investments by foreign investors are not only subject to approval
by the government institutions relevant for the investment, but also have to be
registered with the SAFE. The same applies for the issuance of securities and
derivatives by foreign institutions in Mainland China.81 Outward direct
investments and the issuance of securities and derivatives by domestic investors
abroad are subject to registration by the SAFE.
The capital control regime in total is discriminatory. It does not only separate
between cross-border flows under the current and capital account, but it also
discriminates between desired and undesired capital flows. It aims at limiting the
74People’s Bank of China (2005), p.1
75Monetary Policy Analysis Group of the PBoC (2012-2013), p.1
76State Council of the PRC (2008)
77Ma and McCauley (2007), p.14
78State Council of the PRC (2008), p.2
79State Council of the PRC (2008), §15 and §20
80State Council of the PRC (2008), §12 and §15
81State Council of the PRC (2008), §16
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influx of speculative capital, while it encourages at the same time direct
investments by foreign investors into the Chinese economy.82
2.2 Financial intermediation in China
The broad credit transmission channel rests on the assumption, that borrowers
are willing to pay an external finance premium for funding through financial
intermediation, as they cannot source funds otherwise without incurring higher
additional costs or might be unable to source external funds at all.83 Two
characteristics of the financial sector in Mainland China lend themselves to
assume that the transmission channel was present in the period between 2008
and 2012. The financial system is dominated by the banking sector with
relatively little room for non-bank financial institutions.84 Stock market funding
for example remained below 10% of GDP during most of the period and dropped
to a low of 3.82% in 2012.85 Capital markets remain comparatively shallow and
over 60% of outstanding bonds are issued by the government. State-owned policy
banks are the second largest issuer of bonds.86 Despite their rapid development,
these markets are still comparatively small, especially concerning corporate debt
issuance. Stock market capitalization stood at 44.36% of GDP for 2012.87
Another characteristic are the close ties between the state and the commercial
banks, that enable policy considerations to override credibility and best practice
considerations, especially concerning the external funding of state-owned
enterprises and local government projects.88
Banking sector: The Chinese banking sector has been under constant reform and
announcements of reforms for decades. The Chinese government repeatedly
pledged its commitment to an opening of China’s financial markets to foreign
investors, with relatively little effect. Domestic finance markets are gradually
opened to foreign investors, but at a slow pace.89 The banking sector is lagging
behind the overall economy in its reform and modernization. Recent research
describes the sector as defunct and lacking in efficiency. While official
non-performing loan (NPL) levels are small and far from the high numbers
82Ma and McCauley (2007), p.14
83Friedman and Woodford (2010), p.548
84IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department (2012), p.6
85Financial Stability Analysis Group of the PBoC (2013), p.243
86IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department (2012), p.6 Policy banks provide funding
for state projects, economic and trade development, comparable to the European Investment
Bank
87Financial Stability Analysis Group of the PBoC (2013), p.243
88see Goodstadt (2012), p.15-16
89Goodstadt (2014), p.22
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recorded before 2001, the business practices that lead to the crippling NPL levels
of the preceding decade are still present in the period between 2008 and 2012.90
With the transition of the economy and the subsequent collapse of many
uncompetitive state-owned enterprises, the banks accumulated record amounts of
NPL. In Q4 2004 a staggering amount of 13% of all credit fell in the
non-performing category. This situation prompted the creation of asset
management companies (essentially bad banks) that bought NPL at face value
from the ailing state-owned commercial banks.91 The NPL were then bundled
and auctioned off. This and the recapitalization of the banks alleviated the
situation and stabilized the banking sector.92
The banking sector was opened gradually to foreign investors and competitors
following China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. Both foreign investors and the
Chinese government attached high hopes with this opening. Foreign investors
hoped for a rapid expansion on the yet untapped Chinese banking market and
especially the underdeveloped markets for securities and financial derivatives.
The Chinese government hoped that stronger competition and the influx of
foreign know-how and best practice would provide an incentive for the domestic
banks to shape up, improve their competitiveness and adopt best practice
business conduct. The opening was also seen as a way to leap frog the
development of domestic financial markets and financial innovation.
Few of these high hopes materialized to date, not at least due to the many
strings - provisions called prudential regulations by the Chinese authorities - that
were attached to the market entry and operations of foreign investors,
hamstringing a rapid expansion of foreign competitors and limiting the scale and
scope of competition. Foreign investors’ enthusiasm subsided with the start of
the worldwide financial crisis in 2008. Scarce funds dissuaded foreign banks from
expanding/maintaining their not as profitable as hoped operations in China. Due
to the institution of benchmark rates on deposits, foreign banks could not offer
favorable interest rates to potential customers to compete with the established
banks and their visible presence (branch offices) throughout China. Accordingly
foreign funded banks relied mainly on the interbank market to fund their
operations. A reliance that made operations difficult when worries about the
credibility of foreign banks in 2008/2009 raised the cost of interbank financing for
foreign funded banks. Foreign funded banks remain a small presence in China,
their market share has remained fairly small between 2008 and 2012, holding on
average 2% of the assets of all banking institutions.93
Chinese interest in the involvement of foreign investors and shareholders in the
90Goodstadt (2012), p.1, Goodstadt (2014), p.22-24
91IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department (2012), p.7
92Goodstadt (2012), p.1
93China Banking Regulatory Commission (2013), p.151
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banking sector was founded by two complimentary ailments of the sector -
insufficient risk assessment capabilities and business decisions driven by political/
relationship considerations instead of best practice. The state-owned commercial
banks and smaller state controlled local banks were entrenched in the local
structures of government and the communist party. This enabled collusion and
corruption to the detriment of sound risk assessment and best practice. State
owned enterprises received credit without proper risk assessment. This was
coupled with a generally poor state of management and best practice know-how
within the banks.94 According to Goodstadt, the two practices of political
lending and relationship lending are a persistent feature of the banking sector.
Political lending refers to a lending practice, where banks are compelled to
finance projects because they meet the requirements of a state plan or policy.
Relationship lending characterizes a lending practice, where loan applications
backed by high-ranking officials cannot be denied.95 Goodstadt argues, that the
remaining control of the state over the banks and their lending decisions is an
important lever for the implementation of policy in the Chinese economy.96
In official statistics, the banking sector is typically segmented into a variety of
different categories according to bank size and ownership structure. A dominant
share of the market is held by the five largest commercial banks. These banks are
former wholly state-owned commercial banks, that had IPO as part of their
restructuring to prepare for the market opening. These banks are banks funded
for specific policy goals, that over time reformed into full commercial banks.
With their development into commercial banks new policy banks were
established. The PBOC sums six banks under the category of large commercial
banks: The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the Bank of
China (BOC), the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Chinese Construction
Bank (CCB) and the Bank of Communications (BCOM).97 Together these six
banks held around half of all assets of the banking institutions. The market
share of these banks has declined in recent years, giving greater importance to
localized rural and urban commercial banks and so called joint-stock commercial
banks. The joint-stock banks are commercial banks that are partly held by local
governments. Table(2) shows the distribution of the assets of the Chinese
banking sector among the different categories of banks, excluding the state-owned
policy banks. Notable is the relative dominance of the five largest commercial
banks and the stagnating share of foreign funded banks between 2008 and 2012.
Following the financial crisis of 2008 the banking sector has accompanied the
94Goodstadt (2012), p.4-6
95Goodstadt (2014), p.6-7
96Goodstadt (2014), p.13
97China Banking Regulatory Commission (2013), p.145
98Own calculations, source China Banking Regulatory Commission (2013), p.151
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Institution 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Large Commercial 56.65% 56.22% 53.5 % 51.58% 49.06%
Joint-Stock 15.36% 16.29% 17 % 17.68% 19.22%
City/Rural 19.75% 19.77% 21.12% 21.97% 22.76%
Non-bank 2.05% 2.14% 2.38% 2.51% 2.64%
Foreign funded 2.34% 1.86% 1.99% 2.07% 1.94%
New-type/Postal 3.85% 3.73% 4% 4.19% 4.37%
Table 2: Distribution of all assets of Chinese banking institutions excluding policy
banks98
government stimulus with an explosive increase of loans, especially with loans to
local governments, underpinning the stimulus initiated by the central
government.99 Between 2007 and 2012 total loans more than doubled (an
increase of 242% over 5 years) reaching 67.3 trillion yuan in 2012. The primary
source of funding for the banking sector were deposits included in broad money,
which accounted for 64.4% of all liabilities of other depository corporations at
the end of Q4 2012. Banking in China is primarily confined to a fairly traditional
model of banking. The primary source of funding are deposits, with interbank
markets and alternative sources of funding being a distant second source. Funds
are lent to domestic customers (households and commercial) predominantly
medium to long term. A significant share of assets is allocated to reserves held
with the central bank.
2.3 Financial crisis and the PBOC
The financial crisis and the deceleration of worldwide economic activity had a
significant effect on China’s current account balance. Demand for Chinese
exports was reduced in the USA and Europe. The financial crisis sparked a
recession in the USA, that reduced demand for exports in China’s main trading
partner. The liquidity crisis of the European banking sector, lead to a sovereign
debt crisis in several European countries and consequently to an economic
contraction and reduced export demand. This added to the overall decline in
external demand for Chinese goods and the decreased influx of foreign
investment into China in late 2008 and early 2009. The current account surplus
declined from 108.4 billion USD in the fourth quarter of 2008 to 39.8 billion USD
in the third quarter of 2009.100
99Goodstadt (2012), p.20-21
100Data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2007-2012)
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China’s government reacted to the reduced worldwide economic activity by
announcing a stimulus package, to sustain growth in China and to further
develop China’s domestic markets. This stimulus package lead to a rapid growth
in bank lending and investment by local governments and stated-owned
enterprises. As described, bank loans increased at an explosive pace and grew by
242% between 2007 and 2012.101
The economic downturn in the USA and Europe pushed both the Federal
Reserve and the ECB to adopt a policy of lowering their policy interest rates in
an effort to prop up banking sector liquidity, incite investment and to prevent
deflationary developments. The gradual reduction of the policy interest rate by
both central banks eventually reached the lower bound of zero percent.
Prompted by the inability to further lower the interest rate, the central banks
adopted unconventional methods of monetary policy to further influence the
economy. Declining policy interest rates and market insecurity precipitated a
flight towards safe assets and a decline of the interest earned on these safe assets.
Especially US Treasury securities saw a significant reduction in interest rates.
Before the financial crisis interest rates in Mainland China were below the
interest rates of the Eurozone and the USA. This shifted when the financial crisis
shook the US economy. Interest rates in the USA dropped, while the Chinese
interest rates remained stable initially.102 Figure (3) highlights the development
of aggregate interbank rates for debt contracts with a 3 months maturity for
Mainland China(Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate), the US-Dollar(US-Dollar
LIBOR) and the Eurozone(EURIBOR). Interest rates in Mainland China stayed
higher than the rates in the USA and remained above these rates for the
remainder of the depicted period. The debt crisis in the Euro-zone triggered a
gradual reduction of the ECB policy interest rate, ultimately reaching zero
percent. This prompted the EURIBOR to decline and to fall below the SHIBOR,
where it remained for the remainder of the depicted period.
This clear shift of the interest rate differential at the onset of the recession in the
USA is the basis for the use of a shock on the foreign interest rate in the model
simulations described in this thesis. The simulation recreates in a simplified way
the development of Chinese and US interest rates in the aftermath of the
financial crisis.
The change of the interest rate differential and the reduction in value of assets on
the US financial markets poses a serious problem for the Chinese central bank.
On one hand there is the loss of capital due to the reduction of value for a
101Goodstadt (2012), p.20-21
102Chang et al. (2015), p.2 for a comparison of the US treasury interest rates and SHIBOR
rates
103Data from own calculations source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2007-2012), Deutsche
Bundesbank (2007-2012), China Foreign Exchange Trade (2007-2012)
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Figure 3: Quarterly averages for SHIBOR (black), US-Dollar LIBOR (red) and
EURIBOR (blue) with a 3 months maturity 103
variety of USD assets held by the central bank. While the PBoC does not
publish the composition of its foreign asset holdings, data from the US treasury
indicates a significant investment in US treasury securities.104 The New York
Times reports in an article from September 2008, that China’s central bank had
also invested in mortgage-backed debt issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
investments that had declined sharply in value.105
The reversal of the interest rate differential on the other hand, makes sterilizing
foreign exchange interventions via central bank bonds a costly enterprise.
Figure(4) shows the percentage of total liabilities of the monetary authority that
were held as currency in circulation, deposits by financial institutions (required
reserves and excess reserves) and outstanding central bank bonds. The peaks of
104U.S. Department of the Treasury (2007-2012)
105Bradsher (2008)
106Data: own calculations source: People’s Bank of China (2008-2012a)
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Figure 4: Percentage of total liabilities of the central bank held as currency in
circulation (black), deposits of financial institutions at the central bank (red) and
central bank bonds outstanding (blue) 106
the currency in circulation at the start of each year are a cultural phenomenon
resulting from the increased demand for cash during the Chinese New Years
holidays. The graphs show a strong increase in the percentage of deposits, while
the amount of outstanding bonds declines throughout the depicted period and
currency in circulation remains relatively stable (excluding the start of the year
peaks). Outstanding bonds decline not only relative to the increasing overall
liabilities of the central bank, but also in absolute terms. In reflection to the
absence of new bond auctions in 2012, outstanding bonds stood at 1.38 trillion
RMB in December 2012 with total liabilities of 29.45 trillion RMB, while
outstanding bonds stood at 3.433 trillion RMB with total liabilities of 13.25
trillion RMB.107 This development lends validity to the assumption, that the
reversal in the interest rate differential induced a change in the methods and
107Data People’s Bank of China (2008-2012a)
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scope of sterilization of the central bank.
A change in the scope of sterilization, by an increase in the money supply and a
reduction in central bank bonds, is the model response to the simulation of a
foreign interest rate shock described by Chang et al. 108 A development that is
replicated in the simulations described in this thesis.
3 Research question
As shown in figure (3) China faced a distinct problem originating from the
financial crisis. In addition to the reduction in worldwide economic activity, the
financial crisis also lead to a reversal of the interest differential between China
and its main trading partners. The higher pre-crisis interest rates on US
securities had provided a favorable environment for the sterilization of the
increase in the money supply generated by the current account surplus. The
central bank could draw higher interest payments from its foreign reserves, than
it had to pay on domestic central bank bonds. This changed with the financial
crisis. Now domestic Chinese interest rates surpassed those in China’s trading
partners. A reversal that happened in addition to the dramatic decline in value
of a wide variety of foreign assets. Chang et al. show in the simulation of a
negative foreign interest rate shock in their model of the Chinese economy, that
this shock precipitates a reduction in the scale of sterilization by the central
bank. The stock of central bank bonds is reduced.109 The shock leads to a
deviation of the policy interest rate, inflation, real GDP and the foreign assets to
GDP ratio from their steady-state values. This deviation of the policy target
variables means that the central bank policy targets are not fulfilled, causing a
loss in overall welfare.110
Frictions in financial intermediation have an impact on the transmission of
monetary policy into the real economy. An often observed phenomenon in the
simulation of frictions in financial intermediation is their potential to increase the
impact of monetary shocks on the real economy.111 Given the dearth of
alternative funding channels in Mainland China outside of bank lending, the
broad credit transmission channel and its impact on monetary policy
transmission is particularly pertinent for China. Additionally financial
intermediation in China has a set of regulatory characteristics that can influence
financial intermediation in general. Minimum required reserves can and are used
as a tool for the management of financial sector liquidity and arguably for the
108Chang et al. (2012), p.15
109Chang et al. (2012), p.13-15
110Chang et al. (2012), p.25-26
111for example Bernanke et al. (1999), p.1370
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sterilization of foreign exchange interventions.112
The question derived from these two observations is then, how frictions in
financial intermediation alter the reaction of the central bank to the foreign
interest rate shock. Do frictions and regulations influence the change in the scale
of sterilization by the central bank? How does the implementation of frictions
and regulation impact the fulfillment of the central bank’s policy targets?
Questions that ultimately are aimed at providing an assessment on the question
of the sustainability of the monetary policy regime.
112Ma et al. (2011), p.6
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Part III
DSGE Model configuration and simulation
The first part of this chapter introduces a sequence of three DSGE models,
constructed using the same basic setup and parameter calibration. Each new
model is a step used to add features, gradually establishing a comprehensive
model of the Chinese monetary policy framework. The primary goal of this
step-by-step setup is to enable comparisons. These comparisons are the chosen
method to examine the effects the inclusion of a financial sector and required
reserves have on the assessment of the resilience of the monetary policy stance
towards external shocks. The setup is meant to allow for a ceterum paribus
assessment of these feature’s effects. The secondary aim is one of presentation.
The sequential addition of features allows for a more thorough presentation of
the thought process guiding the implementation of the features and the rational
for the choices made in the construction of the models.113
The first model introduced is a model without financial sector or required
reserves, that is referred to as the benchmark model. The second model
introduces a financial sector into the framework set by the first model, it is
referred to as the simple model. The third model further builds on the second
model by introducing required reserves and deposit rate monitoring, it is referred
to as the Chinese model.
The second part of the chapter consists of a closer examination of the effect
different paths of policy reform (opening the capital account, floating the
nominal exchange rate or both) have on the assessment of the optimality of
monetary policy regime development in the Chinese model.
The DSGE models developed in this paper are a modification of a model
proposed by Chang Chun, Liu Zheng and Mark M. Spiegel in a 2012 paper. It
further uses concepts from a variety of other current papers on monetary policy
in China and frictions in financial intermediation. The model aims to incorporate
the current state of DSGE modeling of financial frictions.
The methodology of the model is similar to a 2012 paper by Chen Qianying,
Michael Funke and Michael Paetz and a follow up paper by Michael Funke and
Paetz also published in 2012.114 The newer paper evaluates financial system
reform initiatives and proposals in China using a closed economy DSGE model.
It provides a framework for the implementation of minimum required reserves
and deposit rate mandates. This framework is used in the present paper.
113The use of a baseline model with the same steady-state is similar to Bernanke et al. (1999),
p.1370
114Where the second paper builds on and expands the framework established in the older paper
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As the original model by Chang et al., the present paper uses a small
open-economy approach and a central bank, that uses the money supply growth
rate as its main instrument to enact monetary policy. This approach is quite
different to the standard of models exploring the effect of financial frictions. In
these models, base money can often be omitted and the central bank’s main
instrument is the nominal policy interest rate. A paper using such a model is a
2010 paper published by Ali Dib. Dib evaluates the role of the banking sector in
the transmission of aggregate shocks into the real economy. The banking sector
proposed by Dib is the basis for the banking sector implemented in the present
paper. Further input into the configuration of the banking sector is derived from
a paper published by Bjo¨rn Hilberg and Josef Hollmayr in 2013. Their paper
develops a model similar to the model used by Dib in 2010, in order to analyze
liquidity problems on the interbank market, especially when examining
unconventional monetary policy.
The capital creator as an important part of the real economy represented in the
model was implemented in reference to the capital creator used in the PESSOA
model described by Vanda Almeida et al. in a 2013 publication. The paper
describes in depth a DSGE model for a small economy within a monetary union
(where monetary policy is decided outside of the domestic economy). This is also
linked to the New Area Wide Model (NAWM) for the Euro-zone as described by
Kai Christoffel, Gu¨nter Coenen and Anders Warne in 2008.
The implementation of financial frictions is further inspired by the framework for
credit market frictions in business cycle analysis presented by Mark Gertler and
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki in the 2010 edition of the Handbook of Monetary Economics.
Another source of inspiration is a 2011 publication by Mark Gertler and Peter
Karadi concerned with the effects of unconventional monetary policy in the
presence of financial frictions. A more recent model examining the effect of
financial frictions taken into account in the development of the present paper is a
paper published by Markus K. Brunnermeier and Yuliy Sannikov in 2014. The
paper examines the dynamics of an economy when financial frictions are present.
4 Benchmark model
The basic setup of the benchmark model is that of a small open economy model,
where the domestic country represents Mainland China and the foreign country
the rest of the world. Households are modeled to derive utility from holding real
money balances. Following the SOE setup, the domestic economy is taken to be
sensitive to changes in the foreign economy, while the foreign economy is immune
to developments on the domestic market. Given this immunity, foreign country
variables can be adequately represented by exogenous processes. This applies to
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the foreign interest rate and foreign inflation as well as the demand for exports.115
The domestic country is made up of five modules or agents. These are the
domestic households, the singular intermediate goods producer and the central
bank, a continuum of capital creators and a continuum of entrepreneurs.
Households, central bank and the intermediate good producer are mostly the
same as in Chang et al..116 The capital creators are a less complex version of the
capital goods producers described in the PESSOA model.117 The entrepreneur
agent is based on Dib and Hilberg.118. Entrepreneurs are modeled to own firms
that produce a differentiated retail good, these firms are based on Chang et
al..119 The introduction of capital in the model is crucial for the introduction of
financial frictions in the later iterations of the model. It is implemented here to
increase the cohesion between the different model iterations and the
comparability of simulation results. This step assures that the real production
side is similar in all model iterations.
The domestic economy is set up in a way that is assumed to reflect the reality of
the Chinese economy - it sources an aggregate of raw materials and
intermediate/capital goods (assembly parts, machinery) from the foreign country
and exports an aggregate of final goods. The economy is geared towards export
and has a current account surplus in the initial steady-state. The imported goods
are refined by the use of labor and capital into a variety of differentiated final
goods in two consecutive steps. The first step is the assembly of an intermediate
good using labor and the import goods and the second step is the production of
retail goods using the intermediate good and capital. The differentiated retail
goods are aggregated into a final good. This final good is consumed domestically
by households and exported abroad. 120
Monetary policy is characterized by a closed capital account and a pegged
exchange rate. The crawling peg used in Chang et al. is not recreated in the
benchmark model, a hard peg is used instead.121 This change is implemented to
reduce complexity and is possible since this change has no impact on the
viability of simulation results.
Imposed by the closed capital account private domestic entities are prohibited
from holding foreign currency assets and private foreign entities cannot
accumulate domestic currency assets either. The model has no venue for the
transfer of capital by private entities between the countries. Foreign entities are
115Chang et al. (2012), p.7&12
116Chang et al. (2012), p.8-15
117Almeida et al. (2013), p.33-36
118Dib (2010), p.16-18 and Hilberg and Hollmayr (2013), p.4-6
119Chang et al. (2012), p.10-11
120Chang et al. (2012), p.7
121Chang et al. (2012), p.13
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barred from investing on the domestic financial market, which prevents arbitrage.
This strict limitation also prohibits foreign direct investment. Accordingly foreign
direct investment is not taken into account in the construction of the model.
As in Chang et al., the only government agent fleshed out in the model is the
central bank. Non-monetary policy interventions by other government actors (as
in investment, government consumption, treasury bonds and taxes) are outside of
the scope of the model, as an inclusion would entail a significant increase in
complexity without yielding more information concerning the topic discussed in
this text.122
The central bank in the model is a reflection of the actual Chinese central bank.
It deviates from the central bank agent commonly used in the literature on
financial frictions in key areas. The common Taylor-rule based central bank
reflects western central banking by using the policy interest rate as the primary
instrument of monetary policy.123 In contrast to this, similar to the People’s
Bank, whose monetary management relies on the use of quantitative targets and
administrative controls, the central bank in this model controls the domestic
money supply growth rate as its main instrument to conduct monetary policy.124
The money supply growth rate is subject to a quadratic Ramsey policy function.
The central bank adjusts the money supply growth rate conditional to the
minimization of welfare losses incurred by deviating from a set of monetary
policy targets.125 Wages and prices are modeled as rigid following Calvo and
Rotemberg.126 With this focus the model centers on the compromises the central
bank has to make to minimize its losses through deviation from policy targets
and the cost incurred by its sterilization interventions. A schematic of the
benchmark model can be found in figure (15) in Appendix A.
4.1 Aggregation
In the model the final good and labor are aggregated composites constructed as
shown below.127
The retail good (Yu,t) produced by the individual entrepreneur is aggregated into
the final good (Yt), which is then exported or consumed locally. The
differentiated retail goods are situated on the interval u ∈ [0, 1] and the
aggregation technology for the final good is given by
122Chang et al. (2012), p.7
123Christiano et al. (2010), p.20-21
124Cassola and Porter (2011), p.3
125Chang et al. (2012), p.15
126Calvo (1983), p.385-387 and Rotemberg (1982), p.1189-1193
127Chang et al. (2012), p.8
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Yt =
[∫ 1
0
(Yu,t)
θu−1
θu du
] θu
θu−1
(1)
where θu is the elasticity of substitution between retail goods. From this the
demand function for the individual retail good Yu,t is given by the function
Y ∇u,t =
[
Pu,t
Pt
]−θu
Yt (2)
where Y ∇u,t is the demand for the differentiated retail good and Pt is the domestic
price index which is related to the price of the retail good (Pu,t)u∈[0,1] by
Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0
(Pu,t)
(1−θu)du
] 1
1−θu
.
The aggregation for labor is similar. The differentiated labor skill (Nh,t) provided
by the individual households is situated on the interval h ∈ [0, 1]. The skills are
aggregated into the labor composite by the technology given below
Nt =
[∫ 1
0
(Nh,t)
θw−1
θw dh
] θw
θw−1
(3)
where θw is the elasticity of substitution between the differentiated labor skills.
The demand function for the labor skill Nh,t is then described by the equation
N∇h,t =
[
Wh,t
Wt
]−θw
Nt (4)
where Wt is the composite wage related to the wage (Wh,t)h∈[0,1] of the
differentiated labor skill Nh,t by Wt ≡
[∫ 1
0
(Wh,t)
(1−θw)dh
] 1
1−θw
4.2 Household module
The domestic households are modeled according to a standard money in the
utility function setup taken from Chang et al..128 Based on this setup the
domestic country is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived utility
maximizing household agents. These households are situated on the interval
h ∈ [0, 1]. The inclusion of money in the utility function links the money supplied
by the central bank to the real economy. In the symmetric equilibrium money
supply and household money balances are equal. Utility is derived from three
different sources, consumption, real money balances and leisure. Each household
is equipped with a differentiated labor skill. The skill is priced at a wage set by
128Chang et al. (2012), p.8
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the individual household. Households gain their funds for consumption and real
money balances from providing their labor skill to the labor aggregation.
Accordingly households face a trade-off between consumption and money
balances and the exponential disutility incurred by giving up leisure time for
work. The domestic households are modeled as the owner /shareholders of the
entrepreneur and capital creation agents, therefore each household receives a
share of the aggregated profits of both agents. Funds not consumed in the current
period can be transferred into future periods by purchasing domestic central
bank bonds. The utility function for the individual household is shown below.
Uh = E
∞∑
t=0
β
[
lnCh,t + φm ln
M•h,t
Pt
− φn
(N∇h,t)
1+η
1 + η
]
(5)
Where Ch,t is real consumption,
M•h,t
Pt
are the real money balances and N∇h,t is the
demand for units of labor provided by the household. M•h,t is the nominal money
held by the individual household, in the symmetric equilibrium this is equal to
the nominal money supplied by the central bank, Mt. The time preference factor
indicating the strength of the household’s preference for utility earned in the
current period over expected utility in future periods, and by this the propensity
to save, is represented by β. The real utility weight for holding real money
balances is represented by φm and φn is the weight of the disutility incurred from
exchanging units of leisure for units of labor. η represents the inverse Frisch
elasticity for hours worked. Et is an expectation operator.
Households maximize their lifetime utility by choosing consumption, real money
balances, saving and the optimal wage subject to the demand schedule for labor
and the real budget constraint. Households take demand for their labor skills as
given and are monopolistically competitive in the market for labor skills. The
real one period budget constraint for the individual household is stated below.
Ch,t+
M•h,t
Pt
+
Gh,t
Pt
=
Wh,tN
∇
h,t
Pt
+
M•h,t−1
Pt
+
Rt−1Bh,t−1
Pt
+
τh,t
Pt
−Ωw
2
(
Wh,t
Wh,t−1p¯i•
− 1
)2
Nt
(6)
In this equation
τh,t
Pt
represents the real share of dividends the household receives
from capital creator and entrepreneur agents,
Gh,t
Pt
are the real holdings of the
central bank bonds and Rt is the nominal policy interest rate set by the central
bank.
Wages are modeled as rigid. Quadratic adjustment costs provide a threshold for
wage adjustments that delay the reaction of wages to shocks. The equation for
the quadratic adjustment costs is shown below, where Ωw is the average wage
adjustment cost and p¯i• is steady-state wage inflation. Wage inflation is defined
as pi•t ≡ WtWt−1 .
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Ωw
2
(
Wh,t
Wh,t−1p¯i•
− 1
)2
(7)
In the symmetrical equilibrium, each individual household is presumed to set
individual nominal wages and to make identical optimization choices, subscripts
can therefore be dropped. Optimality in the symmetric equilibrium is
characterized by the first-order conditions of the household’s utility
maximization. These first-order conditions are the derivation of the utility
function conditional on the demand schedule for labor and the one period budget
constraint for consumption, real money balances, bonds and wages.
φm
M•t Λt
=
Rt − 1
Rt
(8)
1 = Etβ
[
Λt+1
Λt
Rt
pit+1
]
(9)
Λt =
1
Ct
(10)
Where Λt is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint.
The first-order condition for wages, the wage setting rule, is described by the
equation below
wt =
θw
θw − 1φnN
η
t −
Ωw
θw − 1
{(
pi•t
p¯i•
− 1
)
pi•t
p¯i•
− βEt
(
pi•t+1
p¯i•
− 1
)
pi•t+1
p¯i•
}
(11)
where wt ≡ WtPt is the real wage.
4.3 Intermediate good producer
As in Chang et al. the production sector of the model is split in two parts with
two input and one output factor each.129 The first step of the production path is
the single domestic intermediate good producer. It combines aggregate labor and
the import good to create the intermediate good. The intermediate good
producer is strictly a non-maximizing agent, that takes all demand and prices as
given and provides the intermediate good at its real cost.
The intermediate good is produced using a common Cobb-Douglas technology
without technology augmenting component. The resulting technology is as
follows.
129Chang et al. (2012), p.8-9
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Y †t = N
α
t Y
?,(1−α)
t (12)
Where α is the expenditure share of aggregate labor, Y †t represents the
intermediate good and Y ?t is the imported good.
The nominal price for the imported good is the foreign price index P ?t .
Accordingly the real price for the good is defined as Qt ≡ t P
?
t
Pt
, where t is the
nominal exchange rate for the conversion of one unit of foreign currency into
domestic currency. By this definition the real price Qt for the imported good is
the real exchange rate.
With this in mind changes in the real exchange rate between periods can be
captured by the following equation.
Qt
Qt−1
=
t
t−1
pi?t
pit
(13)
where pi?t is the foreign country inflation rate defined as pi
?
t ≡ P
?
t
P ?t−1
. The real
marginal cost of the intermediate good is given by the following equation,
V †t = α˜w
α
t Q
1−α
t (14)
Optimizing costs yields the following joint cost function
wtNt =
α
1− αQtY
?
t (15)
where V †t is the marginal cost and α˜ is defined as α
−α(1− α)(α−1).
4.4 Capital creator
The capital creator implemented in this model is based on the capital creator
agent presented in PESSOA.130 Real capital represents a wide variety of
infrastructure and machinery used in the production of the domestic retail good.
The domestic country is populated by a continuum on infinitely lived capital
creation agents situated along the interval κ ∈ [0, 1]. New capital is created by a
linear production technology combining investments and depreciated capital from
the previous period. Capital creators are perfectly competitive in input and
output markets. As a simplification to the creation agent in PESSOA, the
multiplier of investment is set to one and the price for investment is set equal to
the domestic price index.131 Accordingly the real price for investment is defined
130Almeida et al. (2013), p.33-35
131Almeida et al. (2013), p.33-34
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as pi,t ≡ Pi,tPt = 1. The development path for the capital stock of the individual
capital creator is shown below,
Kκ,t = Iκ,t + (1− δ)Kκ,t−1 (16)
where Kt represents real capital and δ is the domestic depreciation rate for
capital.
The maximization problem of the individual capital creator is given below,
τκ,t = p

tKκ,t − Iκ,t − pt (1− δ)Kκ,t−1 −
Ωk
2
(
Iκ,t
Iκ,t−1
− 1
)2
It (17)
where τκ,t are the real net profits and the last term of the equation captures the
quadratic adjustment costs for changes to investment. Ωk stands for the average
adjustment costs. pt is the real capital price defined as p

t ≡ P

t
Pt
.
The capital creator (κ) maximizes profit by choosing the optimal investment.
Substituting the development path for capital into the profit equation, the
following equation can be formed
τκ,t = (p

t − 1)Iκ,t −
Ωk
2
(
Iκ,t
Iκ,t−1
− 1
)2
It (18)
From this equation the first-order condition for optimal investment can be
derived. In the symmetric equilibrium with dropped subscripts the first-order
condition is
pt = 1 + Ωk
[(
It
It−1
− 1
)
It
It−1
− βEt
(
It+1
It
− 1
)
It+1
It
]
(19)
4.5 Entrepreneur
The entrepreneur agent replaces the retail goods firm used in the Chang et al.
model. Their setup is a slight modification of the entrepreneur agent used by Dib
and Hilberg and Hollmayr in combination with the retail firm agent used in
Chang et al.132 Conceptually the entrepreneurs represent managers of the firms
producing the retail goods. These firms refine the intermediate good together
with real capital into a differentiated retail good, using a Cobb-Douglas
production technology. They are the model equivalent of the large export
oriented manufacturing sector that has sprung up in China in the last decades.
The domestic country is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived
entrepreneurs, which are risk neutral and situated on the interval u ∈ [0, 1].
132Chang et al. (2012), p.10, Dib (2010), p.16 and Hilberg and Hollmayr (2013), p.4-5
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Entrepreneurs are set up to be profit maximizing. They maximize their lifetime
profits by setting the price for their differentiated retail good. This maximization
is subject to the demand for the final good, which is taken as given.
Entrepreneurs are monopolistically competitive for their retail good.
The individual entrepreneur’s firm combines real capital and the intermediate
good to produce a differentiated retail good, that is then aggregated into the
final good aggregate. The retail good production technology with a technology
augmenting component is given below,
Yu,t = AtK
γ
u,t−1Y
†
t
(1−γ)
(20)
where Yu,t stands for the individual retail good and γ is the expenditure share of
capital. At represents the technology augmenting component, which is the same
for all retail firms.
The technology augmenting component is constructed in the same way as in
Chang et al..133 It is composed of a permanent component Aρ,t and a transitory
component Am,t, the equation for the composition of At is At = Aρ,tAm,t.
Aρ,t follows a random walk process with the drift ψt, which is an AR(1) process.
The equation for the drift component is given by
lnψt = ρρ ln(ψt−1) + (1− ρρ) ln ψ¯ + σρϕρ,t (21)
where ρρ is a persistence parameter and σρ is the standard deviation. ϕρ is an
exogenous shock variable. ψ¯ is the steady-state/mean drift.
The technology drift component is used as a trend variable for the transformation
of the model. The transformation of the stationary symmetric equilibrium into a
balanced growth path is a reflection of the rapid growth of the Chinese economy
in the period of reference. It is replicated from Chang et al.. 134
The transitory component is a stationary (mean-reverting) stochastic process,
governed by the equation
lnAm,t = ρm lnAm,t−1 + σmϕm,t (22)
where ρm is a persistence parameter, and σm is the standard deviation. ϕm is an
exogenous shock variable.
The marginal costs of production for the individual retail good, represented by
Vu,t are accordingly given by the following equation,
Vu,t =
γ˜
At
Zγu,tV
†
t
(1−γ)
(23)
133Chang et al. (2012), p.10-11
134Chang et al. (2012), p.28
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where γ˜ is constructed in the same way as α˜. The variable Zu,t stands for the
marginal productivity of the capital employed in the production process. This
variable is the entry point of the net worth concept into the model and is crucial
for the introduction of financial frictions in later iterations of the model. It is
introduced here to enhance the cohesion between the model iterations.
Cost optimization then yields the following joint cost function for capital and the
intermediate good.
Zu,tKu,t−1 =
γ
1− γV
†
t Y
†
u,t (24)
Conceptually capital is purchased by the entrepreneur and then rented to the
entrepreneur’s retail good firm. Capital is purchased in advance - capital used in
the current period had to be purchased in the preceding period. In this concept
the marginal productivity of capital is the rent the entrepreneur receives for
holding capital. Depreciated used capital is resold to the capital creators. The
realized marginal productivity and the marginal real price of the resold used
capital give the realized marginal returns on holding capital shown in the
equation below. Where R†u,t are the realized marginal returns on capital.
R†u,t = Et [Zu,t + (1− δ)pt ] (25)
Entrepreneurs retain the returns from holding capital, this is the entrepreneur’s
net worth and use it to purchase new capital for the following period. The
development path for the net worth is captured in the equation below,
Υu,t = R
†
u,tKu,t−1 (26)
where Υu,t is the net worth.
The concept of net worth is relatively superfluous in this model, as it lacks the
option for external financing. Accordingly the current net worth is equal to the
real value of the capital purchased. The equation below illustrates this relation.
Υu,t = p

tKu,t (27)
As stated, the entrepreneur’s optimization problem is to maximize lifetime
profits. The equation for the current period profits is given below.
τu,t = Pu,tY
∇
u,t − Vu,tY ∇u,t −
Ωy
2
(
Pu,t
Pu,t−1p¯i
− 1
)2
Yt (28)
Ωy are accordingly the average adjustment costs and p¯i is the steady-state
domestic inflation. The variable τu,t stands for the real net profits and the last
term of the equation are the quadratic costs for the adjustment of the price of
the retail good.
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Solving for the retail good price subject to the demand for the retail good yields
the following first order condition for optimality in the symmetric equilibrium.
Subscripts are dropped as before.
Vt =
θy − 1
θy
+
Ωy
θy
[(pit
p¯i
− 1
) pit
p¯i
− βEt
(pit+1
p¯i
− 1
) pit+1
p¯i
]
(29)
4.6 Foreign country
The open economy aspect of the model is established through the inclusion of the
foreign country agent, which conceptually represents the rest of the world. In line
with the SOE premise, the foreign country is immune to changes within the
domestic country. The foreign country purchases the final good from the
domestic country and provides the import good to the intermediate good
producer. The foreign country offers foreign currency assets on the foreign
finance markets, that pay the foreign interest rate - since the capital account is
closed only the domestic government can hold foreign currency assets.135
The foreign interest rate is represented by an autoregressive process AR(1) with
the equation
R?t = ρr lnR
?
t−1 + (1− ρr) ln r¯? + σrϕr,t (30)
where R?t is the foreign interest rate, r¯
? is the steady-state foreign interest rate,
ρr is the persistence parameter and σr is the standard deviation of the AR
process. The variable ϕr,t is the exogenous foreign interest rate shock.
Export demand is inversely related to the price of the final good and positively
related to the exogenous export demand component . By including the
technology drift component a balanced growth of the export demand is assured.
The equation for export demand is then as below,
Xt =
(
Pt
tP ?t
)−θ?
X˜?tAρ,t = Q
θ?
t X˜
?
tAρ,t (31)
where Xt represents exports (which are equivalent to export demand) and X˜
? is
the exogenous export demand component. θ? is the export demand elasticity.
The exogenous export demand component follows an AR(1) process given by the
following equation,
X˜?t = ρ? ln X˜
?
t−1 + (1− ρ?) ln ¯˜x? + σ?ϕ?t (32)
where ρ? is a persistence parameter, ¯˜x
? is the steady-state export demand
component, σ? is the standard deviation and ϕ
?
t is the exogenous export demand
shock.
135Chang et al. (2012), p.12
42
The current account is defined as the sum of net exports and interest income
from holding foreign currency assets - as the capital account is closed foreign
country agents cannot hold domestic currency assets. The current account is
therefore captured by the equation below
Θt ≡ Xt −QtY ?t +
t(R
?
t−1 − 1)B?t−1
Pt
(33)
4.7 Central bank
The sole government entity fleshed out in the model is the domestic central bank.
In this iteration of the model the central bank is tied to the government’s
commitment to a fixed exchange rate and a closed capital account and monetary
policy is informed by this mandate. A mandate that the central bank has to
adhere to regardless of the effort necessary for the maintenance of the framework.
The central bank is constructed according to Chang et al..136 The central
instrument of monetary policy used in the simulation, is that the central bank
controls the growth of the money supply. The growth rate is set by the central
bank and controls the inter-period changes to the domestic money supply, the
relation is defined by µt ≡ MtMt−1 .
Conceptually, entrepreneurs acquire foreign currency through their gains from
exporting the final good. These gains are then immediately exchanged for
domestic currency at the pegged nominal exchange rate, as private entities are
barred from holding foreign assets. Imports are payed for by foreign currency
that the intermediate good producer exchanges with the central bank for
domestic currency. In a second step the central bank invests the foreign currency
it acquires through this process in foreign currency assets. The model abstracts
this process by omitting the exchange between entrepreneurs and the
intermediate good producer with the central bank. So that the net profit from
exports and imports is directly reflected in the change of the central bank’s
foreign asset holdings. Accordingly the current account is tied to the change in
the central bank’s foreign asset holdings by the relation given below.137
Θt = t
B?t −B?t−1
P ?t
(34)
When the current account is negative, foreign asset holdings are reduced. If the
negative current account persists long enough or becomes massive enough, the
central bank’s foreign asset holdings would be depleted and it would have to
acquire foreign currency credit to maintain the chosen monetary policy path. In
136Chang et al. (2012), p.12-13
137Chang et al. (2012), p.12
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the case of a current account surplus, the foreign asset holdings of the central
bank grow. Over time, as is the case in China, the foreign asset holdings can
become fairly large and the influence of the central bank on the market for
foreign assets can become an impediment to the conduct of monetary policy.
Without subsequent interventions by the central bank, current account
imbalances would either increase or decrease the domestic money supply. For the
model central bank this is generally undesirable as it would mean to deviate from
the bank’s policy target on the domestic money supply - which is coupled with
policy losses as well as unintended effects on the domestic economy.
Consequently the central bank engages in sterilizing behavior to manage the
growth of the money supply. This is accomplished by swapping central bank
bonds with the private sector for domestic currency. As such the intervention is
not neutral to the central bank balance, but it shifts the growth in liabilities
from the money supply to fixed term debt - effectively taking the money created
by the central bank out of the economy. Complete sterilization of the current
account surplus would be reached if the money supply remained unchanged in
the event of changes to the current account surplus. The change in the foreign
asset holding of the central bank would instead be answered by a change in the
central bank bonds, as shown by Chang et al..138 Conceptually though full
sterilization might not be desirable. There is on one hand the issue of costly
sterilization, describing a situation where the interest on central bank bonds is
higher then the foreign interest rate. On the other hand sterilization interferes
with other policy targets, especially with the target on the domestic policy
interest rate. Accordingly it can be assumed that sterilization might not be
complete, but that the central bank allows for a certain amount of change in the
domestic money supply, dependent on the current account. The central bank’s
flow of funds budget is captured by the equation below.139
t
(
B?t −R?t−1B?t−1
)
= Mt −Mt−1 +Gt −Rt−1Gt−1 (35)
4.8 Conditions for market clearing and equilibrium
An equilibrium in the model economy is reached when, taking every price but the
price for its own retail good as given, the price and resource allocations for each
individual entrepreneur solves its profit maximization problem. The wage and
the allocations for each individual household solves the utility maximizing
problems, when all prices and wages but its own are taken as given. When each
individual capital creator takes all prices and investment allocations as given but
138Chang et al. (2012), p.12
139Chang et al. (2012), p.12
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its own, the investment allocation solves its profit maximizing problem.
Additionally the markets for final goods, the intermediate good, composite labor,
composite capital, money balances and bond holdings all clear.140
Given government policy, the set of equations below characterize the conditions
under which the model economy reaches a symmetric equilibrium.
Yt = Ct +Xt + It +
[
Ωy
2
(pit
p¯i
− 1
)2
+
Ωw
2
(
pi•
p¯i•
− 1
)2
+
Ωk
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2]
Yt (36)
GDP t = Ct +Xt −QtY ?t + It (37)
M•t = Mt (38)
Kt =
∫ 1
0
Ku,td(u) (39)
Y †t =
∫ 1
0
Y †u,td(u) (40)
4.9 Quadratic Ramsey Policy Function
Key to the simulation is the concept of optimization by the central bank. This is
introduced by attributing a set of different targets for conflicting monetary policy
goals into a quadratic Ramsey policy function. Three of these targets are fairly
standard and consist of a target for the domestic policy interest rate, the GDP
and domestic inflation. The target on the nominal policy rate is a reflection of
the central bank’s desire for a smoothing of changes in the domestic policy rate.
The motive of interest rate smoothing is a common assumption of financial
frictions literature, typically expressed by the assumption that policy rate setting
is governed by a rate smoothing Taylor rule. If the central bank has to adjust the
policy interest rate following a shock on the foreign interest rate, this interferes
with the central bank’s ability to autonomously set the domestic policy rate.
This would create an undesired and unpredicted deviation from the targeted
development path of the policy rate. Chang et al. innovate this standard trio by
adding a target for the ratio of foreign currency assets held by the central bank
to the domestic GDP.141 Conceptually this is a reflection of the reluctance of the
Chinese central bank to conduct disruptive operations on the foreign financial
140Chang et al. (2012), p.14
141Chang et al. (2012), p.15
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market during the international financial crisis and the ensuing US recession. For
the simulation the introduction of the target for foreign currency assets is
necessary to restrain the model central bank from answering shocks in foreign
interest rates solely by selling its foreign currency assets. If in the simulation the
foreign interest rate shocks are deemed to impact the domestic economy, then the
central bank must be constructed as having a reluctance to radically change its
foreign asset holdings.
Attributed to each of the policy targets is a policy weight. These weights reflect
the importance the central bank attributes to maintaining a given target. For
this simulation the weights used are the same as in Chang et al.. Accordingly the
weight on the policy interest rate target is set at ∆r = 5, the weight on the GDP
target is ∆gdp = 0.05, the weight on domestic inflation ∆pi = 1 and finally the
weight on the GDP to foreign assets ratio is given by ∆? = 0.01. The target
hierarchy imposed by this choice replicates a central bank with a significant
preference for interest rate smoothing and to a lesser degree inflation control over
domestic GDP and the GDP to foreign assets ratio.142
Given the weights, the central bank optimizes by minimizing the overall loss
incurred from target deviation - it minimizes a Quadratic Ramsey Policy
Function subject to log-linear optimization conditions.143 In the simulation the
policy targets are set to be equal to the steady-state values of the policy
variables. Deviations from targets are then represented by the log-linearized
deviations of the variables from their steady-state values. Optimality is
accordingly characterized by minimizing the quadratic losses from the
log-linearized deviations from the steady-state, captured by the Quadratic
Ramsey Policy Function given below.144
ςt =
∞∑
t
∆r(rˆt)
2 + ∆gdp( ˆgdpt)
2 + ∆pi(pˆit)
2 + ∆?( ˆgdpt − bˆ?t )2 (41)
where ςt is the overall loss to be minimized, rˆt, ˆgdpt, pˆit and bˆt are the
log-linearized deviations of the policy rate, GDP, domestic inflation and central
bank bonds from their steady-state value respectively.145
A An elaboration on the argument for a weight on the foreign asset to GDP ratio
Key to the experiment undertaken in this paper is the assumption of a central
bank that aims at smoothing the development of the domestic country’s net
142Chang et al. (2012), p.16-17
143Chang et al. (2012), p.15
144Chang et al. (2012), p.15
145Chang et al. (2012), p.17
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international position. This is introduced in the model configuration by defining
a policy target for the foreign assets to GDP ratio.146 The formulation of this
axiom is crucial for the simulation of the effects of a negative foreign interest rate
shock on the domestic monetary policy. It creates a path through which the
foreign interest rate shock can affect the domestic economy. Without it the shock
can be absorbed by a proportional reduction of the growth of the foreign asset
position of the central bank. Accordingly the shock would only affect the current
account surplus and the foreign assets position. The transmission of the shock
into the domestic economy is dependent upon the existence of a cost associated
with a change to the foreign assets to GDP ratio.147 This quadratic cost assures
that the growth of the foreign assets position of the central bank is reduced less
than it would have to in order to completely absorb the foreign interest rate
shock. The reduction of the growth reaches a point, at which a further decrease
is more costly than the deviation of other policy targets would be. Minimization
of the Ramsey function then precipitates an increase of money supply growth to
prevent a further decrease of the foreign assets growth.
Chang et al. justify their introduction of a central bank with a desire to avoid
large fluctuations of its foreign asset holdings relative to GDP with two
arguments. The empirical observation, that abrupt changes to the foreign assets
to GDP ratio have not been observed in the past, and that the sharp decline in
returns on foreign assets following the financial crisis has not caused a
substantial sell off of foreign assets by the Chinese central bank. The second
argument derives from the dominant position of the PBOC on especially the
market for US Treasuries. The PBOC position on the market means, that it is
keenly observed by other market participants and that changes in the central
bank’s behavior are likely to affect world prices.148 Given the persistence of
current account surpluses for Mainland China in the aftermath of the financial
crisis, the empirical argument needs further elaboration. The repatriation of
earnings from exports and outward investment leads to an accumulation of
foreign currency by the central bank in some form and with a positive current
account the assets accrued by this are more than is needed to account for the
outward flow of funds from China to the rest of the world. Accordingly the
argument is not that the persistent growth of the foreign asset position is proof
enough for a policy of smoothing concerning the foreign assets to GDP ratio.
The argument is more precisely that the reduction in interest rate earnings from
foreign assets has not been fully compensated by a proportional reduction in the
growth of the foreign asset holdings. Secondly the argument is, that despite the
146Chang et al. (2012), p.15
147Chang et al. (2012), p.15
148Chang et al. (2012), p.15
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sharp decline in remuneration for US Treasuries in the direct aftermath of the
financial crisis, this has not induced a drastic reconfiguration of the PBOC
foreign asset portfolio at that precise point in time.
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Figure 5: Annual change in percent of the foreign asset to GDP ratio and the
current account to GDP ratio for Mainland China 149
Figure(5) shows the annual changes in percent of the foreign asset to GDP ratio
and the current account to GDP ratio. It can be observed, that the fluctuations
of the foreign assets to GDP ratio have become more subdued over time and that
especially the financial crisis has not induced a strong reaction of the ratio. The
foreign asset ratio grew by 4.11% from 2007 to 2008 and by 7.56% from 2008 to
2009, while the current account surplus grew by 19.08% from 2007 to 2008 and
declined by 42.16% from 2008 to 2009. The graph also highlights another
important factor of the discussion, the assumption of a desire to smooth the
development of the foreign assets to GDP ratio by the Chinese central bank is
not presumed to be a general rule of the Chinese monetary policy in this paper.
It is valid uniquely for the period of the financial crisis and its direct aftermath.
149Data: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2007-2012)
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Several factors come together at the onset of the financial crisis, that validate the
assumption of a desire to smooth the foreign asset to GDP ratio by the PBOC.
The first is the market position argument brought forth by Chang et al.. China’s
position on the market combined with the uncertainty prevailing in financial
markets about the extent of the crisis, meant that the biggest entity in the
market for US Treasuries was observed closely by other market participants.
Severely limiting the space in which a change to the central bank’s behavior
could occur without further destabilizing the international monetary framework.
Media reports about an alleged threat by China to sell its Dollar reserves were
countered with an affirmation of China’s role as responsible investor and the
long-term nature of its investment. 150
The second factor derives from the potential market impact of an abrupt change
in central bank behavior. A rapid decline in the value of foreign assets would
counteract the stated goal of preservation and appreciation of China’s national
exchange reserves, which is a guiding principle of the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange’s conduct.151 The value preservation intention favors an
approach that tries to avoid sending strong signals towards other market
participants. The SAFE notes, that the financial crisis provided a significant test
for the operation and management of foreign reserves. A test that the
administration claims to have withstood by adopting a prudent approach
towards the effects of the international financial crisis.152 The SAFE acted for
example by purchasing bonds from international financial organizations and by
‘buoying up’ overseas investment and international cooperation.153
The third factor comes from the commitment of the Chinese government to the
international effort to contain and reduce the effects of the financial crisis on the
international monetary framework. The PBOC participated in the international
response to the financial crisis. Among others engaging in the fund raising of the
IMF, by purchasing up to 50 billion US-Dollars in IMF Notes.154
4.10 Balanced growth path and parameter calibration
For the simulation - as in Chang et al. - the model given above is transformed
into a balanced growth path model, where output, consumption, real money
balances, current account balances, real domestic debt, real foreign assets, real
investment, and the real wage grow at a constant rate. The transformation
reflects the rapid growth of the Chinese economy. The balanced growth path is
150People’s Bank of China (2007)
151Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange (2009)
152Chinese State Administration of Foreign Exchange (2009)
153People’s Bank of China (2010), p.60
154People’s Bank of China (2010), p.32
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established by stationary transformations as shown below.155
yt =
Yt
Aρ
, wt =
Wt
PtAρ
, pt =
P t
PtAρ
, ct =
Ct
Aρ
mt =
Mt
PtAρ
, gt =
Gt
PtAρ
, y?t =
Y ?t
Aρ
, it =
It
Aρ
zt =
Zt
Aρ
, Θ˜t =
Θt
Aρ
, b?t =
B?t
P ?t Aρ
, Υ˜t =
Υt
Aρ
(42)
Following these transformations, the balanced growth equilibrium is summarized
by the set of equations for the endogenous variables given below
Domestic household
φm
mtλt
=
rt − 1
rt
(43)
1 = Etβ
[
λt+1
λtψt+1
rt
pit+1
]
(44)
λt =
1
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(45)
wt =
θw
θw − 1φnn
η
t −
Ωw
θw − 1
{(
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p¯i•
− 1
)
pi•t
p¯i•
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− 1
)
pi•t+1
p¯i•
}
(46)
wt
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=
pi•t
pitψt
(47)
Intermediate goods producer
y†t = n
α
t y
?
t
(1−α) (48)
qt
qt−1
=
pi?t
pitψt
(49)
v†t = α˜w
α
t q
(1−α)
t (50)
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α
1− αqty
?
t (51)
Capital creator
kt = it +
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ψt
kt−1 (52)
pt = 1 + Ωk
{(
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− 1
)
it
it−1
− βEt
(
it+1
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− 1
)
it+1
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}
(53)
Entrepreneur
Υ˜t = p

tkt (54)
155Chang et al. (2012), p.28
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Υ˜t = r
†
tkt−1 (55)
r†t = zt + (1− δ)pt (56)
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(60)
Foreign country
xt = q
θ?
t x˜
? (61)
Θ˜t = xt − qty?t + qt
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pi?tψt
(62)
Central bank
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(65)
Equilibrium conditions
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2
(
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yt (66)
gdpt = ct + xt − qty?t + it (67)
A Parameter choice
A key part in the simulation of the model presented above is the choice of values
for the constant parameters. The choice is inspired by the idea of capturing
features of the Chinese economy. The first apparent thing is the higher
propensity to save than in more advanced western countries in general, which is
introduced by a particularly high time preference factor of β = 0.998. There is
only a relatively small discount for the utility of future consumption and real
money balances. As in Chang et al., the weight on real money balances is set at
φm = 0.06. This implies that real money holdings provide relatively little utility.
The weight on the disutility from hours worked is set at φn = 1.013, which is the
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same as in Dib 2012. The inverse Frisch elasticity for hours worked is set to
η = 10 giving a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 0.01 as in Chang et al.. The
export demand elasticity θ? is set to 1.5 as in Chang et al.. The elasticity of
substitution for the differentiated labor skills is set at θw = 10 with the average
adjustment cost of wage changes given by Ωw = 100, representing an average
duration for the wage contract of four quarters. The elasticity of substitution for
the differentiated final good is set to θy = 10 and the average adjustment costs
are calibrated to Ωy = 30, which gives an average duration for the retail good
price contract of three quarters. Given the idea of sluggish investment
adjustment taken form PESSOA, the average investment contract is supposed to
last for four quarters, the average adjustment costs are then Ωk = 100.
156
Parameter Value
β 0.998
θy 10
θk 10
θw 10
θ? 1.5
Ωw 100
Ωy 30
Ωk 100
η 10
φn 1.013
φm 0.06
α 1/2
γ 1/3
δ 0.025
Table 3: Calibrated
parameter values
The share of labor in the production of the intermediate
good is set at α = 1/2 giving an equal weight to the
imported good in comparison to labor. The share of the
real capital in the production of the retail good is set at
γ = 1/3, favoring the intermediate good over capital. The
intertemporal depreciation rate is set to 0.025, as in Dib.157
B Steady-state calibration
The second step in the numerical solution of the model is
the calculation of an initial steady-state without exogenous
processes. This simulation is based on a steady-state, that
is calculated using a number of preset key variables meant
to reflect the actual Chinese GDP composition in the
past decade, as shown in World Bank statistics. For the
simulation the GDP is thought to be split between private
consumption, government spending, capital formation
(investment) and net exports. The statistics yield a GDP
composition for 2013 ( in brackets the figures for 2000)
as consumption is at 36% (47%), government spending
at 14% (16%), investment at 48% (35%). Exports were at
23% (21%) and imports at 21% (19%). Which yields average net exports of 2%.
As government spending is not part of the model, this is lumped together with
private consumption.158
Starting from ¯gdp = 1, the components of GDP are set to consumption c¯ = 0.50,
investment set to i¯ = 0.48 and net exports set at x¯− q¯y¯? = 0.02. The
steady-state value for the technology drift is set to ψ¯ = 1.02 as in Chang et al..
156Chang et al. (2012), p.16-17, Dib (2010), p.34, Almeida et al. (2013), p.33
157Dib (2010), p.34
158Source: The World Bank (2000-2013)
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Foreign inflation is set to p¯iψ¯. The domestic interest rate is set to r¯ = 1.01 and
the foreign interest rate is set to r¯? = 1.02 creating an initial interest differential
that favors the foreign interest rate as in Chang et al. The stationary technology
component is set to unity. 159
Variable Value
r¯ 1.01
r¯? 1.02
ψ¯ 1.02
p¯i β r¯
ψ¯
p¯i? p¯iψ¯
A¯m 1
ρr 0.97
Table 4: Cali-
brated values of
preset steady-state
variables
The initial steady-state is subject
to a one percent negative shock on the foreign interest
rate. The shock is calibrated as relatively persistent
- with the persistence parameter set to ρr = 0.97.
4.11 Simulation results
The full set of equations for the steady-state and log-linear
form of the endogenous variables of the benchmark
model can be found in Appenix A. The impulse
response functions (IRF) of the variables represented
in the Ramsey function are shown in figure (6).
Broad strokes: As can be seen in the IRF, there are
two distinct immediate effects of the foreign interest rate
shock. The first is a decline in the nominal policy rate and
the second is an initial expansion of the domestic economy.
Both developments are linked to the reversal of the
differential between the policy rate and the foreign interest
rate. In the steady-state, the foreign interest rate was
above the policy rate. The shock pushes the foreign interest rate below the policy
rate. This puts pressure on the policy rate. Central bank policy though is
strongly biased against target deviations of the policy rate. The policy rate
declines, but not as much as it would have to reestablish the steady-state interest
differential. Which leaves the central bank in an unfavorable position concerning
its sterilization of the current account surplus. Domestic bonds now carry higher
interest than foreign assets. Accordingly the scale of sterilization decreases,
leading to an increase of the money supply. The money supply increase pushes
inflation and with sticky prices, this leads to an initial expansion of the domestic
economy.
In detail: To assess the results shown in the IRF, it is helpful to look at the way
in which the decline of the foreign interest rates propagates through the model.
In the log-linear version of the model, there are two endogenous equations, which
directly include the foreign interest rate: The equation capturing the current
159Chang et al. (2012), p.16-17
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Figure 6: Deviations of log-linearized policy variables from the steady-state over
20 periods in percent after a persistent negative 1% foreign interest rate shock
account surplus and the equation for the central banks flow of funds budget. In
both equations the foreign interest rate is included with a one-period lag.160
Without the policy weight on the foreign asset to GDP ratio, simulating the
model shows that only foreign assets, current account surplus and the foreign
asset to GDP ratio are affected by the decline of the foreign interest rate. The
IRF show a delayed reaction of the endogenous variables to the shock,
conforming to the lag on the foreign interest rate; there is no reaction of the
model in the initial period. While the second period shows a sharp decline in the
current account surplus, due to the reduction in the interest earnings from
foreign assets. Foreign assets and foreign asset ratio start to decline slowly after
the initial period. The decline in the foreign assets implies that the central
bank’s flow of funds budget remains balanced throughout. As described, the flow
160See equations (174) and (176) in Appendix A
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of funds budget of the central bank is given by the equation
t
(
B?t −R?t−1B?t−1
)
= Mt −Mt−1 +Gt −Rt−1Gt−1 (68)
According to this the asset side of the flow of funds budget would increase, if
foreign assets remained stable, necessitating an increase on the liabilities side of
the budget. But without a weight on the foreign asset to GDP ratio, the central
bank reduces foreign assets to match the decline in interest earnings from holding
foreign assets in the preceding period. By this the propagation of the decline of
the foreign interest rate is kept from affecting the domestic economy, with the
drawback of having a massive variance in the foreign asset to GDP ratio of 7.32%.
The description above explains how the foreign interest decline affects the
domestic economy, when a weight on the foreign asset to GDP ratio is
implemented. With the weight it is prohibitively costly for the central bank to
reduce its foreign asset holdings to the degree that would be necessary to match
the decline in interest earnings from holding foreign assets in the preceding
period. Optimizing the loss function leads to an immediate reaction of the
central bank to the decline in the foreign interest rate.
The central bank reduces its holdings of foreign assets in the initial period.
Logically the deviations from the steady-state in the steady-state are zero,
meaning that variables that enter the model with a one-period lag are zero in the
initial period. Accordingly the initial decrease in foreign assets leads to an
increase on the asset side of the flow of funds budget. Which has to be matched
by a reduction on the liabilities side of the budget.
If there was no weight on the domestic policy rate, the central bank could
maintain the steady-state interest rate differential by reducing the domestic
policy interest rate accordingly. Then the optimal reaction would be a reduction
of central bank bonds in line with the reduction of foreign assets, thus keeping
the flow of funds budget balanced. With the weight, keeping the differential is
too costly for the central bank, the central bank is forced to intervene to stabilize
the domestic policy rate. Accordingly the reduction of the domestic policy rate is
not as strong as would be necessary. This makes sterilization through the
issuance of central bank bonds less attractive for the central bank. Central bank
bonds decline sharply in the initial period, reflecting this reduced desirability for
the central bank.
This leaves the flow of funds budget unbalanced. The decrease in liabilities is
higher than the decrease in assets. There is only one avenue left open to achieve
a balance: an increase in the domestic money supply. The central bank controls
the money growth rate and a sharp increase in the growth rate can be observed
in the initial period. In the model, the money growth rate is the outcome of the
loss minimizing Ramsey function. Given the optimizations of the private entities,
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minimizing the loss function results in the money growth rate increase observed
in the simulation. The optimization governs how strongly the central bank
intervenes and how much it lets the foreign assets to GDP ratio, domestic
inflation, real GDP and the domestic policy rate deviate from their steady-state
values.
The changes in the central bank’s flow of funds budget and the money supply
then propagate into the domestic economy. In the log-linear model the equations
affected by the changes are the first order conditions of the domestic household.
The domestic households are the counterparts to the central bank bonds and are
holding real money balances, it is therefore logical that their optimization is
affected. Equation (155) and the Euler equation (156) connect the domestic
policy rate and money supply with the households’ Lagrange multiplier. The
strong initial increase in the money supply forces the Lagrange multiplier to
decline, while the simultaneous depreciation of the domestic policy rate reduces
this effect somewhat.
The Lagrange multiplier is negatively correlated with domestic consumption. A
decrease in the Lagrange multiplier entails an increase in domestic consumption.
Lower interest rates make saving less attractive and lead to reallocation of
household funds into real money balances and consumption. This increase in
consumption drives domestic demand, increasing overall output. The economy
experiences an expansionary push in the initial period, that would be absent
without the intervention of the central bank.
The demand for the imported good increases and the marginal productivity of
capital increases, driving the marginal costs for the retail good upwards initially.
The initial rise in inflation can be attributed to the increase in marginal costs for
the retail good. The higher demand for labor drives real wages upwards. This
increase is dampened by the existence of wage rigidities. Wage inflation rises
initially in line with the overall inflationary impulse following the increase in the
money supply.
The real exchange rate is negatively correlated with domestic inflation.
Accordingly the real exchange rate depreciates initially, as inflation increases.
This lowers the real price for the import good, reducing the increase in the
marginal costs for the intermediate good - and a strong initial expansion of
imports. Since export demand is tied to the real exchange rate, export demand
declines as the real exchange rate depreciates.
In the post initial period two things occur, the shock on the foreign interest rate
begins to fade out of the simulation and the lagged foreign interest rate affects
the model through the current account surplus and the flow of funds budget.
This is the period with the strongest decrease of the current account surplus.
The increase in wages, the depreciation of the real exchange rate and the decline
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Figure 7: Benchmark model IRF of the current account and money supply growth
rate after a persistent foreign interest rate shock
in export demand all have their peak in this period. While the foreign asset
holdings of the central bank decline further.
After the initial intervention, there is no subsequent intervention of the central
bank, accordingly the money supply starts to decline. This decline is matched by
a decline on the assets side of the flow of funds budget, due to the reduced
holdings of foreign assets. The central bank’s flow of funds budget begins to shift
back towards its steady-state setup. As the foreign interest rate shock fades, the
interest rate differential moves back towards its steady-state level. Thus
sterilization via central bank bonds becomes more attractive and central bank
bonds increase. Meaning also, that households shift funds back from
consumption into savings, consumption and domestic demand declines. Declining
money supply and rising domestic interest rates entail a decrease in domestic
inflation. This in turn drives the real exchange rate and export demand. Rising
export demand and real interest rate together with the rising foreign interest rate
push the current account surplus back to its steady-state level.
Over time, the reduction in the money supply and the appreciation of the policy
rate actually translates into a phase of recession for the domestic economy. The
decline in inflation pushes the real exchange rate to appreciate above its
steady-state level, sharply increasing the costs for the production of the
intermediate good and consumption declines below steady-state levels; decreasing
domestic demand and suppressing real GDP. This is not superseded by the
increase in export demand. The reestablishment of the interest rate differential
eventually leads to the establishment of a new steady-state.
Summary: The simulation shows, that the existence of policy weights on the
domestic policy rate, inflation, real GDP and the foreign asset to GDP ratio
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prompt the central bank to change the scale of sterilization. This reduction in
scale is caused by the constraints put upon the central bank through the policy
weights. Especially the weight on the foreign asset to GDP ratio and domestic
policy rate force an initial increase of the money supply growth rate. This
increase of the money supply in turn creates an initially expansionary push in
the real economy.
Given the small degree of variation between the model proposed in Chang et al.
and the benchmark model used as the basis of this text’s analysis, a high degree
of similarity of simulation results can be expected. This similarity is a desired
outcome, as it validates the choice of a different steady-state and real economy
setup in the benchmark model - Changes that have not overshadowed the
mechanisms outlined by Chang et al.. As a result of the differences in the
steady-states, the amplitudes of the impulse response functions are different,
while the motion of the functions is very close to the graphs published by Chang
et al..161
5 Simple model
The simple model innovates the benchmark model by introducing financial
frictions into the model framework. The method of implementation is derived
from the model published by Dib and also by Hilberg and Hollmayr.162 The
implementation requires the addition of two new agents: a class of households
that owns the commercial banks and provides bank capital to the banks and the
commercial banks themselves. Accordingly domestic households are split
between those that provide labor (workers) and those that provide bank capital
(bankers). Instead of purchasing central bank bonds on the financial market,
workers now save by depositing funds with the commercial banks. As is common
practice, these deposits are implemented as one-period bonds into the model.163
Commercial banks collect these deposits and transform them into loans. Loans
are one-period bonds taken by the entrepreneurs to finance part of their purchase
of real capital. The costs of external funding the entrepreneurs face is influenced
by the external finance premium. This premium is a measure of the riskiness of
an investment and is based on the ratio between the entrepreneurs net worth and
the real value of the total capital purchase. It is assumed that a fraction of the
entrepreneurs defaults each period and is replaced with new entrepreneurs
endowed with seeding money. This is done to ensure that the entrepreneurs can
never fully fund their capital purchase internally and therefore have to rely at
161Chang et al. (2012), p.17-18 and Appendix
162Dib (2010), p.6-16 and Hilberg and Hollmayr (2013), p.8-10
163Dib (2010), p.5 and Gertler and Karadi (2011), p.19
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least partly on external funding. The section below further describes the changes
and additions to the benchmark model. A schematic of the simple model can be
found in figure (17) in Appendix B.
5.1 Aggregation
There are two aggregated composites added to the model, the bank capital
composite and the loan composite.
Conceptually each of the individual bankers provides its own differentiated bank
capital, further referred to as offered capital. This offered capital differentiates
itself by the interest rate attached to it and the specifics of the purchase contract
(payment modalities). The offered capital is then aggregated into a bank capital
composite, that is rented by the commercial banks. The offered capital is
situated on the interval f ∈ [0, 1] and the aggregation technology for the bank
capital composite is given by
St =
[∫ 1
0
(Sf,t)
θf−1
θf df
] θf
θf−1
(69)
where θf is the elasticity of substitution between the offered capital. From this
the demand function for the individual banker’s offered capital Sf,t is given in
the function below
S∇f,t =
[
R◦f,t
R◦t
]−θf
St (70)
where R◦t is the composite interest on bank capital related to the individual
offered capital interest rate (R◦f,t)f∈[0,1] by R
◦
t =
[∫ 1
0
R◦f,t
(1−θf )df
] 1
1−θf .
The loan composite is aggregated from the differentiated bank loans offered by
the individual commercial banks, which are situated on the interval j ∈ [0, 1].
Each bank offers a bank loan Bj,t, that differentiates itself by the interest rate
attached to it and the specifics of the credit contract. The aggregation
technology for the loan composite is captured by the equation
Bt =
[∫ 1
0
(Bj,t)
θj−1
θj dj
] θj
θj−1
(71)
where θj is the elasticity of substitution between the differentiated bank loans.
The demand function for the bank loan Bj,t is accordingly given by
B∇j,t =
[
R‡j,t
R‡t
]−θj
Bt (72)
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where R‡t is the composite lending rate related to the individual bank lending
rate (R‡j,t)j∈[0,1] by R
‡
t =
[∫ 1
0
R‡j,t
(1−θj)
dj
] 1
θj−1 .
5.2 Workers
The workers are a continuum of infinitely lived utility maximizing household
agents. They are situated on the interval h ∈ [0, 1]. Each worker is equipped
with a differentiated labor skill and they are price setters for their individual
skill. The workers derive utility from consumption and leisure. Workers can save
by holding deposits with the commercial banks.164 Workers do not derive utility
from holding real money balances. The anchor for the money supply is instead
provided by the bankers, which in turn are modeled to derive utility from holding
real money balances. This change is necessary due to the shift in the workers
saving behavior. Otherwise the money supply would be tied to the deposit rate,
which would cause problems when simulating the model. The money supply
would be defined twice, once through the money growth rate and once through
the deposit rate. The solution of having the workers no longer derive utility from
holding real money balances is chosen over a solution where the money balances
are split between workers and bankers. Simulation results are similar but the
chosen solution is significantly simpler to implement. The utility function of the
worker household reads as follows, where C•h,t is the individual worker’s
consumption.
Uh = E
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
lnC•h,t–φn
(N∇h,t)
1+η
1 + η
]
(73)
The real one period budget constrain for the individual worker with real deposits
Dt
Pt
replacing central bank bond holdings is then given by the equation below,
C•h,t +
Dh,t
Pt
=
Wh,tN
∇
h,t
Pt
+
R•(t−1)Dh,t−1
Pt
+
τ
Pt
− Ωw
2
(
Wh,t
Wh,t−1pi•
− 1
)2
Nt (74)
where R•t represents the nominal deposit interest rate.
Following this change, optimality in the symmetric equilibrium is then
characterized by the first order conditions given below
1 = Etβ
[
Λ•t+1
Λ•t
R•t+1
pit+1
]
(75)
164Dib (2010), p.5
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Λ•t =
1
C•t
(76)
wt =
θw
θw − 1φnN
η
t C
•
t −
Ωw
θw − 1
{(
pi•t
p¯i•
− 1
)
pi•t
p¯i•
− βEt
(
pi•t+1
p¯i•
− 1
)
pi•t+1
p¯i•
}
(77)
5.3 Bankers
Bankers are a second type of infinitely lived households added to the model.
They own the commercial banks and receive profits from the bank’s
operations.165 They derive utility from consumption and holding real money
balances. Bankers save by purchasing central bank bonds and provide
differentiated bank capital. It is assumed that they have the same time
preference as the worker households. The individual banker’s lifetime utility
function is given by
Uf = E
∞∑
t=0
β
[
lnC◦f,t + φm ln
M◦f,t
Pt
]
(78)
where C◦f,t is the consumption of the individual banker and M
◦
f,t are the money
balances held by the banker.
Bankers maximize their lifetime utility by choosing consumption, money
balances, bond purchases and the optimal offered capital interest rate subject to
the demand schedule for their differentiated offered capital and the real one
period budget constraint. They take offered capital demand as given and are
monopolistically competitive in the market for offered capital. The real one
period budget constraint of the individual banker is given by the equation below,
C◦f,t +
G◦f,t
Pt
+
Sf,t
Pt
+
M◦f,t
Pt
=
R◦f,t−1Sf,t−1
Pt
+
Rt−1G◦f,t−1
Pt
+
M◦f,t−1
Pt
+
τf
Pt
− Ωf
2
(
R◦f,t
R◦f,t−1
− 1
)2
St
(79)
where
τf
Pt
are the banker’s share of bank profits and
G◦f,t
Pt
are the real central bank
bonds held. The choice of the implementation of bank capital lending implies
that the banker’s income reacts with a one-period delay to changes in the
remuneration of bank capital, as there is a one-period lag on the interest earned
from lending capital.
It is assumed that an adjustment of the rent levied on the differentiated offered
capital provided by the banker is costly, this is modeled by the addition of
quadratic adjustment costs.
165Dib (2010), p.6
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Ωf
2
(
R◦f,t
R◦f,t−1
− 1
)2
St (80)
where Ωf are the average adjustment costs.
Optimality in the symmetric equilibrium is characterized by the following
first-order conditions, subscripts are dropped.
φm
M◦f,tΛ
◦
t
=
Rt − 1
Rt
(81)
Λ◦t is the Lagrange multiplier for the banker’s maximization.
Λ◦t =
1
C◦t
(82)
1 = Etβ
{
Λ◦t+1
Λ◦t
Rt
pit+1
}
(83)
The optimal bank capital lending rate in the symmetric equilibrium is described
by the relation below, where equation (83) is used to substitute the Lagrange
multiplier.
R◦t = Rt
[
θf
θf − 1 −
Ωf
θf − 1
{(
R◦t
R◦(t−1)
− 1
)
R◦t
R◦(t−1)
− βEt
(
R◦(t+1)
R◦t
− 1
)
R◦(t+1)
R◦t
}]
(84)
5.4 Entrepreneur
With the net worth setup described in the benchmark model it is relatively
straightforward to introduce an external finance premium into the framework of
the entrepreneur agent. The first addition is a different definition for the net
worth that reads as Υu,t = νΥ

u,t + (1− ν)(SeedMoney). This definition taken
from Dib 2010 establishes, that the net worth in period t is the sum of the
not-defaulting entrepreneur’s gains from capital Υu,t plus the seeding money
received by new entrepreneurs at market entry.166 While the total of
entrepreneurs in the economy remains constant, every period a part of the
entrepreneurs default and leave the economy, these are then replaced by new
entrepreneurs equipped with seed money. The ratio of default is controlled by
the constant ν. The net gains from holding real capital are defined by the
equation below
166Dib (2010), p.17
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Υu,t = R
†
u,tKu,t−1 −
R‡t
pit
ξtBu,t (85)
where ξt is the external finance premium. This equation describes the net worth
at the end of the current period as the gains from the capital utilized during the
period (capital used in the current period is purchased at the end of the
preceding period) less the cost of the externally funded part of the capital
purchase at the end of the current period. The value of the loan contracts signed
by the entrepreneur in period t is the difference between the value of the capital
purchase and the net worth Bu,t = P

t Ku,t −Υu,t.
The marginal external financing costs
R‡t
pit
ξt equal the real lending rate multiplied
with the external finance premium. The external finance premium depends on
the entrepreneur’s leverage ratio. It is defined as a markup on the costs of
external financing dependent on the ratio of capital purchases to entrepreneur
net worth, the form without an exogenous shock used in this model is given by
the equation below,
ξt =
(
P t Ku,t
Υu,t
)ψe
(86)
where ψe is an aggregate risk parameter, as used by Dib, Hilberg and Hollmayr
and Bernanke.167
This equation establishes the concept, that the external finance premium is
dependent on the entrepreneurs stake in the project. A higher quotient signifies a
higher reliance on uncollateralized borrowing to fund the entrepreneur’s project.
This provides not only incentives for the entrepreneur to misreport on the state
of the project, but also raises the necessity and costs of monitoring for the
lending bank. Given the assumption of shallow finance markets, entrepreneurs
have no other equivalent venues to acquire external funds and therefore the costs
of monitoring and riskiness can be pushed onto the borrower.
As a means of simplification, the simulation excludes seed money from
consideration (as a constant it would not be represented in the log-linear form of
the model) and arrives at the following development path for the entrepreneur’s
net worth
Υu,t = ν
[
R†u,tKu,t−1 −
R‡t
pit
ξtBu,t
]
(87)
The production technology and the profit maximization of the entrepreneur’s
firm remain the same as in the benchmark model.
167Dib (2010), p.17 and Hilberg and Hollmayr (2013), p.5
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5.5 Commercial bank
The second agent added to the model are the infinitely lived domestic
commercial banks. Commercial banks offer deposits to labor providing
households and create loans according to a Leontieff production technology.
They acquire bank capital and purchase central bank bonds. The commercial
bank described in this section is in essence an amalgamation of the lending and
borrowing banks from Dib 2010.168
The technology for the creation of loans of the individual bank is given
Bj,t = min [Dj,t, Lj,tSj,t] (88)
where Lj,t is the banks leverage ratio. According to the technology, the amount
of loans produced is restricted by the smaller one of deposits and leveraged bank
capital in the bank’s possession. Loans are solely produced from deposits, the
bank capital is not transformed in the production process, it serves as a limiting
factor for the bank’s loan creation capabilities. This reflects the reality of
leverage legislation, such as the BASEL criteria, that prescribe a minimal capital
ratio for banks. The acquired bank capital is invested in central bank bonds.
The implicit demand functions for the factor inputs are captured by the
equations below
B∇j,t = Dj,t (89)
B∇j,t = Lj,tSj,t (90)
To avoid the conundrum of simultaneous optimization of input and output
factors, it is assumed that the commercial bank takes loan and deposit demand
as given and that the deposit rate is controlled by a linear process. This process
is identical for all banks and establishes the deposit rate as a mark down on the
policy rate dependent on the proportional deposit administration costs
R•t = Rt − χDt (91)
where the constant χ represents the marginal administration costs for deposits.
The optimal leverage rate is chosen by the bank. It is subject to the leverage
ratio restrictions imposed by regulation. As in Dib 2012, a capital ratio above
the required minimum entails convex gains for the bank. The gains for holding
excess capital are modeled as quadratic and given by
Ω`
2
[
L‡ − Lj,t
L‡
Sj,t
]2
(92)
168Dib (2010), p.8-16
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where L‡ is the constant representing the regulatory leverage ratio and Ω` is a
positive parameter. When the actual leverage ratio matches the regulatory one,
there are no gains from excess capital holdings. When Lj,t < L
‡ then the bank
has excess capital which reduces the costs of raising bank capital. As bank capital
is invested in central bank bonds, the marginal cost of holding bank capital is the
difference between the bank capital interest rate and the policy rate R◦t −Rt.
The bank maximizes lifetime profits by choosing the optimal lending rate and
optimal leverage. The nominal problem is characterized in the equation below
τj = R
‡
j,tBj,t − V ‡j,t +
Ω`
2
(
L‡ − Lj,t
L‡
Sj,t
)2
− Ωj
2
(
R‡j,t
R‡j,t−1
− 1
)2
Bt (93)
where the last term represents the quadratic adjustment costs for the lending
rate and Ωj represents the average adjustment costs. The marginal costs V
‡
t ,
composed of the interest payed on deposits and the remainder of the difference
between the deleveraged bank capital interest rate less the central bank rate and
the gains from excess capital holdings, are given by the equation below.
V ‡j,t = R
•
t +
(
R◦t −Rt − (R‡j,t − 1)
(L‡ − Lj,t)
L‡
)
1
Lj,t
(94)
In the symmetric equilibrium optimality is characterized by the first-order
conditions for the lending rate and the leverage ratio given below
V ‡t =
θj − 1
θj
R‡t +
Ωj
θj
{(
R‡t
R‡t−1
− 1
)
R‡t
R‡t−1
− βEt
(
R‡t+1
R‡t
− 1
)
R‡t+1
R‡t
}
(95)
Lt = L
‡
(
1− R
‡
tL
‡
Ω`St
)
(96)
5.6 Equilibrium
In addition to the equilibrium conditions stated in the description of the
benchmark model, the symmetric equilibrium is characterized by meeting the
conditions below.
Overall consumption equals the sum of the consumption of workers and bankers
Ct = C
•
t + C
◦
t (97)
The total amount of central bank bonds equals the bond holdings of bankers and
commercial banks, the bond holdings of banks equal their bank capital holdings
Gj,t = St
Gt = G
◦
t + St (98)
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The markets for bank capital, deposits and loans clear
Bt =
∫ 1
0
Bu,td(u) (99)
Dt =
∫ 1
0
Dh,td(h) (100)
St =
∫ 1
0
Sj,td(j) (101)
5.7 Calibration parameters and steady-state
Parameter Value
Ω` 14.45
Ωf 100
Ωj 100
ν 0.975
`‡ 12.5
χ 0.0005
ψe 0.005
θj 10
Table 5: Calibrated
values for the model
parameters
Where possible the steady-state configuration of the
model uses the same parameter values and steady-state
presets as the numerical solution of the benchmark model.
The rational for the values of the additional parameters
is as follows. As in Dib 2010 the positive parameter
in the quadratic gains from excess bank capital is set
to Ω` = 14.45 and the mandated maximal leverage is set
at `‡ = 12.5 which is the inverse of the BASEL II mandate
of an 8% capital to deposits ratio. The steady-state
bank leverage is ¯`= 11.5, meaning that banks hold a
small amount of excess bank capital in the steady-state.169
The elasticity for the differentiated bank capital is set
to θf = 10 and the elasticity for the differentiated loans is
set to θj = 10. (Aggregate) Lending rates and bank capital
rates are assumed as being relatively sticky with a contract
change occurring on average every 4 quarters, average
lending rate adjustment costs are Ωj = 100 and average
bank capital adjustment costs are given as Ωf = 100. Furthermore it is assumed,
that about 2.5% of entrepreneurs every period default, which makes the rate of
default equal to the depreciation rate accordingly the survival parameter for the
entrepreneurs is given by ν = 0.975. The proportional costs for the
administration of deposits is assumed to be at 20 base points per year which
gives χ = 0.0005. Finally the aggregate risk parameter of the external finance
premium is chosen in accordance with Dib set to ψe = 0.005.
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Furthermore for the steady-state calibration the following additional presets are
used for the calculation. Entrepreneur net worth in the steady-state is set to
169Dib (2010), p.35
170Dib (2010), p.34
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Υ¯ = 1
2
p¯k¯, which calibrates real net worth as well as real loans to half of the real
value of the steady-state capital. Consumption is split between worker’s
consumption and banker’s consumption by c¯• = 1
2
c¯. Steady-state banker’s central
bank bond holdings are set to zero, in accordance with Dib 2010.171 Following
this steady-state bank capital is equal to steady-state central bank bonds.
The initial steady-state calculated with the given presets and parameters is then
used as the starting point of the simulation of a one-percent negative interest
rate shock on the foreign interest rate, creating a positive interest rate
differential between domestic policy rate and foreign interest rate. The shock is
calibrated with the same value for the persistence parameter as in the benchmark
simulation.
5.8 Simulation results
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Figure 8: Simple model IRF of policy variables after a persistent foreign interest
rate shock
171Dib (2010), p.21
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The log-linear form of the equations of the endogenous variables of the Simple
model can be found in Appendix B.2 . Figure (8) shows the impulse reaction
functions of the target variables to a one percent decline of the foreign interest
rate.
Broad strokes: The IRF of the Simple model show the two effects of the foreign
interest rate shock, which could also be observed in the Benchmark model; an
initial decrease in the nominal policy rate and an initial expansion of domestic
real GDP. The development of inflation notably deviates from the Benchmark
IRF. This can be attributed to the existence of proportional administration costs
for deposits. As in the Benchmark model, the reversal of the differential between
policy rate and foreign interest rate is at the root for the changes of GDP and
policy rate. The decline in the foreign interest rate puts pressure on the policy
rate, whose decline is constraint by the policy target on policy rate stability. The
changed interest rate differential raises the costs of sterilization for the central
bank, leading to a reduction in the scale of sterilization. Smaller scale
sterilization leads to an initial increase in the money supply. Different from the
Benchmark model, the expansion of the domestic economy is not pushed by an
increase in consumption by the worker households. The decline in inflation
suppresses domestic wages and reduces worker consumption. The apparent
increase in aggregate demand is instead coming from an increased initial
consumption of the banker households. The decline in the policy rate leads to a
decline in the bank lending rate, reducing the external finance premium.
Entrepreneurs need less credit to finance their capital purchase, credit demand
declines and banks draw less bank capital from bankers. Bankers adjust their
allocation accordingly.
In detail: The simulation of the Simple model without the weight on the foreign
asset to GDP ratio yields a similar result to the simulation of the benchmark
model. Outside of the foreign assets, current account and the foreign asset to
GDP ratio, there is no reaction of the endogenous variables to the foreign interest
rate decline. This shows, that the quadratic costs on the foreign assets to GDP
ratio and the restrictions they put on the reduction of the foreign asset growth,
are necessary for the propagation of the shock into the real domestic economy.
The initial decline of foreign assets is much smaller than in the benchmark
simulation. The initial changes to the central bank’s flow of funds budget are
similar too: Central bank bonds decline and the domestic policy rate depreciates,
while the money supply increases. The central bank intervenes initially by
increasing the money supply growth rate. The extent of the money supply
growth spike is lower than in the benchmark model, the intervention is less
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forceful. The decline in foreign assets and central bank bonds is less pronounced,
accordingly a smaller increase of the money supply is needed to balance the flow
of funds budget in the initial period.
These differences are a result of the different counterparts that the central bank
has for its liabilities in the domestic economy. The counterparts for the central
bank bonds are no longer the domestic households, but commercial banks and
the bankers. Real money balances are held by the banker households instead of
the worker households.
By the bankers’ first order conditions, money supply and the domestic interest
rate are connected with the bankers’ Lagrange multiplier and domestic inflation.
Similar to the benchmark model, the increase in the money supply is coupled
with a decrease of the Lagrange multiplier. Bankers’ consumption grows initially.
Their income is subject to a one-period lag, as they receive the gains from
lending bank capital in the preceding period. Accordingly their income is initially
unperturbed by the decline in interest rates triggered by the central bank. But
the decline in interest rates affects the allocation of funds by the bankers in the
initial period, as prospected gains from lending bank capital are reduced, leading
to higher consumption and larger real money balances held by the bankers.
It is assumed that in the symmetric equilibrium bankers’ central bank bonds
holdings are zero, therefore central bank bonds are modeled as being equal to
bank capital in the log-linear model. The commercial banks invest the bank
capital they hold in central bank bonds. Accordingly the demand for central
bank bonds is dependent on the amount of bank capital acquired by the
commercial banks, and this in turn is governed by the banks’ leverage and the
demand for loans.
The propagation of the expansionary impulse coming from the bankers’ increase
in consumption is clearer to see when the model is simulated without taking
proportional deposit administration cost into account. The rise in bankers’
consumption leads to an increase in aggregate demand and an increase in output.
This expansionary push drives factor demand and the marginal costs for the
retail good, leading to an initial upturn of inflation, wage inflation and a slight
increase in real wages. This, in turn, drives workers’ consumption, who reallocate
funds from saving to consumption. Inflation decreases the real exchange rate,
lowering the price for the import good.
The effect of the proportional administration costs is that a decrease of deposits,
a reduction in saving by the worker households, is coupled with an increasing
deposit rate. This increase counteracts the effect a decrease in the policy rate has
on the deposit rate. Accordingly the impulse response of the deposit rate is
highly dependent upon the parameter choice for the administration costs.
Without the proportional costs deposit rate and policy rate are the same whereas
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high administration costs would cause an increase of the deposit rate in spite of
an environment of overall decreasing interest rates. Model simulations were
conducted without and with proportional administration of 0.05% to assess the
robustness of results.
The existence of the adverse effect of administration costs dampens the impact of
the decreasing domestic policy rate on the demand for deposits. Meaning that
workers reduce their saving to a lower degree than they would otherwise.
Workers’ consumption declines initially, slightly dampening the expansionary
impulse created by the increase of bankers’ consumption. This also eliminates
the initial increase in wages, translating to an absence of the initial spike in wage
inflation and overall domestic inflation.
The expansion of output leads to an increase in use of the intermediate good in
the production of the retail good, while the use of capital remains stable. This
initially increases the marginal productivity of capital, while the gains from
holding capital decrease in line with the drop in the real price of capital. The
real price of capital declines as a reaction to the decline of investment in the
initial period. With stable capital use, the decline in the real price of capital
reduces the funds needed to acquire the capital used in the next period. This
lowers the demand for loans and rises the relative share of the entrepreneur in
the funding project, which in turn drives the external finance premium down,
further reducing the amount of external funds needed for the purchase of capital.
The lower demand for loans is coupled with lower loan creation costs following
the reduced interest paid on bank capital and deposits, leading to a reduction in
the lending rate. Additionally the commercial banks deleverage initially, a
reaction to the shift in the optimal leverage rate due to the lower domestic policy
rate and lending rate.
There are two factors at play that are responsible for the change in the model
response to the foreign interest rate shock. One factor is the different anchor for
the central bank bonds in the economy. The initial decline in central bank bonds
and the domestic policy rate is tied to a decline of bank capital and the deposit
rate. The reduction in the decline of central bank bonds in comparison to the
benchmark model is observable with and without the existence of a financial
accelerator. The initial suppression of interest rates and the lower use of bank
capital have a strong effect on the financial sector - not only do the commercial
banks acquire less bank capital, they also deleverage. Causing a decline in credit
and deposits, that is stronger than the decline in central bank bonds. Meaning
that the economic repercussion of a decline of the domestic policy rate and
central bank bonds are stronger than in the benchmark model. This affects the
central bank’s optimization, resulting in a reduced initial expansion of the money
supply.
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The second factor is the existence of the financial accelerator. In the simulation
with the external finance premium the expansive phase of the economy does not
outlast the initial period. Without the premium real GDP develops similar to
the benchmark model, leading to a higher variance of GDP with the financial
accelerator.
Summary: Overall there is a clear difference in amplitude observable between
the impulse response functions of the benchmark model and the model with a
simple financial sector. The motion of the functions is in general fairly similar in
both models. The introduction of a financial sector amplifies the impact of the
central bank’s response to the foreign interest rate shock on the domestic
economy. The variance of real GDP is significantly higher than in the benchmark
model. The change in the external finance premium acts as an accelerator of
central bank policy. This increase in the impact on the real economy is coupled
with a dampening of the effect of the shock on the other policy targets. In
comparison to the benchmark model the deviation from policy rate, inflation and
foreign asset to GDP targets is reduced. This effect is more pronounced with
administration costs than without. The initial injection of money by the central
bank is significantly smaller than in the benchmark model, creating a smaller
initial expansionary push. Figure (9) illustrates the differences between the IRF
of money supply growth and the policy rate between the models.
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Figure 9: IRF of policy rate and money supply growth rate for the Benchmark
model (black), Simple model (red) and the Simple model without administration
costs (blue)
Like the benchmark model, the impulse response function for the current account
resembles a check mark. The strongest decline of the current account surplus
happens after the initial period, prompted by the decline in the foreign interest
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rate. Contrary to the benchmark model, there is no decline of the real exchange
rate and the reduction in the current account surplus is of a smaller magnitude
than in the benchmark model. As the real exchange rate increases in correlation
with the disinflation in the domestic country, the demand for the import good
drops and the foreign demand for exports increases. The lower current account
reduces the need for sterilization. This coincides with the gradual fading of the
foreign interest rate shock. The differential between the policy rate and the
foreign interest rate progresses towards steady-state levels prompting central
bank policy to move back towards its own steady-state configuration.
6 Chinese model
The next iteration of the model is concerned with widening the complexity of the
simple model to incorporate two important characteristics of the actual Chinese
monetary policy framework. One is the existence of fairly substantial minimum
reserve requirements for the commercial banks. The other is the policy of
mandating interest rate bands on deposit and loan rates. The introduction of the
interest rate mandates is based on Funke and Paetz.172 As a matter of fitting it
into the existing model framework, only mandates on the deposit rate are
implemented - the price setting authority of the individual commercial banks for
their differentiated loans remains intact. Implementing required reserves requires
changes to the commercial bank agent, as well as changes to the balance of the
central bank. The required reserves are a fraction of the deposits held by the
commercial banks and earn interest. With the given steady-state and parameter
choices, the model given below can simulate required reserves ratios between 0%
and 25%. If not stated otherwise, the discussion of the results refers to a
simulation with a 10% required reserves ratio, equal to the rate used in Chen et
al. and Funke and Paetz.173. A schematic of the Chinese model can be found in
figure (19) in Appendix C.
6.1 Commercial banks
The commercial bank agent is changed to allow for the introduction of the
mandated deposit rate band as well as a requirement to hold a constant fraction
of deposits as reserves with the central bank. Funke and Paetz introduce
mandates on deposit rates in their model through an optimization.174 Given that
the upper deposit rate mandate sets the ceiling for the interest on deposits,
172Funke and Paetz (2012), p.14-15
173Chen et al. (2012), p.15 and Funke and Paetz (2012), p.17
174Funke and Paetz (2012), p.14
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banks choose the smaller of the market or mandated rate as the actual rate,
R•t = min(Mandate,Market), though competition provides banks with an
incentive to opt for the mandated rate even when market rates would be smaller.
In the past deviations from the upper band of mandated deposit rate were quite
rare in the Chinese banking sector. Accordingly it is assumed that deposit rates
are mainly determined by the mandated rate. Allowing for a minor influence of
the market rate, deposit rates are modeled as the weighted sum of the market
rate and the upper mandated rate.
With the introduction of required reserves, the loan creation process is changed.
Instead of converting all acquired deposits into loans, banks now have to acquire
one plus the required reserves ratio units of deposits to create one unit of loans.
Required reserves are treated as one-period bonds and earn interest below
market rates for the commercial bank. Accordingly the commercial bank agent is
represented by the following set of equations.
The deposit rate is the weighted sum of the upper mandated rate and the market
rate. Below the log-linear form of the equation governing the development path
of the deposit rate is given.
rˆ•t = θmΞˆt + (1− θm)
(
r¯rˆt − χd¯dˆt
)
(102)
where θm is the weight of the mandated rate in the deposit rate creation process
and Ξt is the upper mandate for the deposit rate set by the central bank.
Loans are created according to the following Leontieff technology
Bjt, = min [(1− θζ)Dj,t, Lj,tSj,t] (103)
where θζ is the constant required reserves ratio.
The implicit demand functions for the factor inputs are accordingly
Bj,t = (1− θζ)Dj,t (104)
Bj,t = Lj,tSj,t (105)
The gains from holding excess capital are the same as before
Ω`
2
[
L‡ − Lj,t
L‡
Sj,t
]2
(106)
The bank maximizes lifetime profits as before by choosing the optimal lending
rate and optimal leverage. The nominal problem is the same as before
τj = R
‡
j,tBj,t − V ‡j,t +
Ω`
2
(
L‡ − Lj,t
L‡
Sj,t
)2
− Ωj
2
(
R‡j,t
R‡j,t−1
− 1
)2
Bt (107)
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Marginal costs are given by the equation below,
V ‡j,t = R
•
t − θζζt +
(
R◦t −Rt − (R‡j,t − 1)
(L‡ − Lj,t)
L‡
)
1
Lj,t
(108)
where ζt is the required reserves interest rate.
The first order conditions for the lending rate and the leverage ratio in the
symmetric equilibrium remain the same
V ‡t =
θj − 1
θj
R‡t +
Ωj
θj
{(
R‡t
R‡t−1
− 1
)
R‡t
R‡t−1
− βEt
(
R‡t+1
R‡t
− 1
)
R‡t+1
R‡t
}
(109)
Lt = L
r ‡
(
1− R
‡
tL
‡
Ω`St
)
(110)
6.2 Central bank
With the implementation of required reserves and mandates on the deposit rate
the scope of central bank policy is widened. The development path for the upper
mandate of the deposit rate is formed according to a technology taken from
Funke and Paetz. 175 The development path is dependent on the policy rate
multiplied with the quotient of the steady-state deposit and policy rates. The
interest rate on required reserves is similarly formed as dependent on the policy
rate. Taken from the substantial resilience of the required reserves interest rate
during the sample period in China, the development path is modeled with
interest rate smoothing and a high persistence parameter for the interest rate of
the previous period. Finally the flow of funds balance is augmented with the
implementation of the required reserves as a liability for the central bank.
Accordingly the central bank is characterized by the following set of equations
The current account equals the changes in foreign assets held by the central bank
Θt = t
B?t −B?t−1
P ?t
(111)
Required reserves are added to the central bank’s flow of funds balance
t
(
B?t −R?t−1B?t−1
)
= Mt −Mt−1 +Gt −Rt−1Gt−1 + θζ (Dt − ζtDt−1) (112)
175Funke and Paetz (2012), p.15
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The upper mandate for the deposit rate is formed by the following technology176,
where ρd is the weight for the deposit rate of the previous period
Ξt = ρd lnR
•
t + (1− ρd)
(
r¯•
r¯
)(1−ρd) lnRt
lnRt−1
(113)
The interest rate on required reserves is subject to the following technology
ζt = ρζ ln ζt−1 + (1− ρζ) lnRt (114)
where ρζ is the weight for the required reserves interest rate of the previous
period.
6.3 Calibration parameters and steady-state
Parameter Value
ζ¯ 1.005
θζ 0.1
ρζ 0.9
ρd 0.7
θm 0.7
Table 6: Calibrated
parameter and
steady-state values
As before, the steady-state configuration is build using
the same preset values as in the previous model iterations
where applicable. There are three new parameters added
to the model: the required reserves ratio, the weight of the
deposit rate mandate and the persistence parameter of the
reserves interest rate. As mentioned before, the required
reserves rate is set at 0%, 10% and 25% alternatively
to examine the impact of rising required reserve
ratios on the impulse responses of the model variables.
Where 0% represents a scenario without reserves, 10%
and 25% are both ratios that the Chinese monetary policy
has oscillated between in the last decades with a peak of a
21% ratio in 2011. The weight for the deposit rate is set at
ρd = 0.7. Given the idea that the interest rate on reserves
is very resilient, the persistence parameter is set to ρζ = 0.9. The weight for the
mandated interest rate is set to θm = 0.7. The only new preset for the numerical
solution of the steady-state is the addition of a steady-state value for the interest
on reserves. Arithmetically this rate has to be smaller than the deposit rate, as
the model could not be simulated otherwise. With that in mind the rate is set at
ζ¯ = 1.005 representing an interest of one percent per annum.
6.4 Simulation results
The log-linear equations configuring the endogenous variables of the Chinese
model can be found in Appendix C.2. Figure (10) shows the impulse response
176Funke and Paetz (2012), p.14
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Figure 10: Chinese Model IRF of policy variables after a persistent foreign interest
rate shock
functions of the target variables when the steady-state of the model described
above is subjected to a one percent decline in the foreign interest rate. The
required reserves ratio is set to 10%, following Funke et al. 2012.
Broad strokes: The IRF again document the two effects of the foreign interest
rate shock. An initial decline of the nominal policy rate coupled with an initial
increase in domestic GDP and inflation. The root for this response is as before
the change in the differential between the policy rate and the foreign interest
rate. The decline of the foreign interest rate puts pressure on the policy rate,
which is constraint in its ability to decline due to the policy target on policy rate
stability. Sterilization through central bank bonds becomes costly for the central
bank, as domestic bonds carry higher interest than foreign assets. This causes a
reduction in the scope of sterilization and an initial increase in the money supply.
Inflation increases and aggregate demand grows as worker’s and banker’s
consumption increases.
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What sets the Chinese model apart form the Simple model is the effect required
reserves have on the amplitude of the deviation of real GDP and the policy rate.
Required reserves reduce the deviation of the real economy, while they enlarge
the deviation of the policy rate. An effect that is scalable with the ratio of
required reserves.
In detail: A simulation of the Chinese model without a policy weight on the
foreign assets to GDP ratio yields a result similar to the previous model
iterations. The propagation of the decline of the foreign interest rate into the
domestic economy again hinges on the existence of the policy weight. Without
the weight only the current account, foreign assets and foreign asset to GDP
ratio are affected by the decline of the foreign interest rate.
The way in which the intervention of the central bank is transmitted into the
domestic economy is changed in two ways from the Simple model. The addition
of the mandate on the deposit rate significantly lessens the increasing effect that
a reduction of deposits had in the Simple model, due to the reduced influence of
the proportional administration costs on the development of the deposit rate.
And the introduction of required reserves adds another tie between the financial
sector and the flow of funds budget of the central bank.
The initial response to the decline in the foreign interest rate is similar to the
previous iterations: Foreign assets and central bank bonds decline slightly.
Additionally the domestic policy rate depreciates, a depreciation that is more
pronounced than in the Simple model, but significantly smaller than in the
Benchmark model. It is similar to the decline in the Simple model without
administration costs. The difference in the amplitude of the initial decline of
central bank bonds can be seen clearly when comparing the IRF and is also
documented in the variances, which for central bank bonds is at 8.8% in the
Simple model and at 5.67% in the Chinese model.
The central bank intervenes initially by expanding the money supply growth
rate. Comparing the variances for the money supply growth rate shows that the
intervention in the Chinese model is between the Simple model and the
Benchmark model in its amplitude - the variance of the money supply growth for
the Benchmark model is 1.18%, for the Simple model 0.3% and the Chinese
model 0.45%. The initial increase in the money supply growth is determined by
the Ramsey function, which means that the minimization differs significantly
between the different models.
Through simulations with different configurations for the deposit rate, it can be
ascertained that the difference in the optimization does not result form the
addition of the mandate on the deposit rate or the reduced impact of the
proportional administration costs. Accordingly the change can be attributed to
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the inclusion of required reserves into the model. It scales with the required
reserves ratio, the variance of the money supply growth rate rises to 0.56% with
a required reserves ratio of 25% and drops to 0.37% with a required reserves ratio
of 0%. The same scaling effect is true for the variance of the central bank bonds,
the variance is lower at higher required reserves ratios.
Required reserves tie the development of deposits to the central banks flow of
funds budget. The amount of deposits taken on by the commercial banks is
correlated with the demand for loans and the banks’ leverage. A depreciation of
the domestic policy rate has a depreciative effect on the financial sectors interest
rates. For the deposit rate this is enforced through the mandate, which is
correlated with the domestic policy rate. This reduces loan creation costs and
leads to a decline in the lending rate on bank loans. The lower lending rate leads
to a reassessment of the optimal leverage ratio for the banks and in turn to a
reduction of bank leverage. The reduction in central bank bonds is reflected in a
decline of bank capital. Lower leverage and less bank capital both force a
reduction of the amount of credit in the economy and the deposits held by the
banks. A reduction of deposits, in turn, reduces the liabilities of the central bank
proportionally to the required reserves ratio. The link between central bank and
deposits created by the banks means that the budget effects of a reduction of
central bank bonds are enhanced by a joint decline of required reserves.
By implementing required reserves, a fraction of deposits is effectively taken out
of the loan creation process. Meaning that the impact of the decline in central
bank bonds is transmitted in a reduced form to the real economy. Especially
since the deleveraging of the banks is less pronounced when required reserves are
implemented. The variance of the leverage ratio changes from 0.03% with 10%
required reserves, to 0.07% without reserves and 0.01% with a reserves ratio of
25%. This creates a higher resilience of the real economy towards the
depreciation of the domestic policy rate. Which allows for a change in the
optimization of the central bank, that leads to a more forceful intervention than
in the Simple model.
The dampening effect of required reserves on the impact of monetary shocks on
the real economy is a phenomenon that is also observed by Dib.177 Simulating
the Chinese model with a required reserves ratio of 0%, 10% and 25% shows that
the dampening effect, as observed in the variance of real GDP, scales with the
ratio. The variance shifts from 0.17% to 0.10% between a simulation without
required reserves and one with a ratio of 10%. It drops further to 0.053%, when
the ratio is raised to 25%.
As in previous iterations, the impulse response function of the current account
resembles a check-mark. The steepest decline is after the initial period, when the
177Dib (2010), p.30
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Figure 11: Chinese model IRF of policy rate and GDP with 10% required reserves
(black), no required reserves (red) and 25% required reserves (blue)
one period lag of the foreign interest rate affects the calculation of earnings from
foreign assets included in the current account. This also coincides with the
strongest decline of the real exchange rate. This reduces the need for sterilization
and as the differential between the policy rate and the foreign interest rate return
to steady-state levels, the model moves back to its steady-state configuration.
Summary: The IRF of the Chinese model show, that it resembles the
Benchmark model in the movement of the policy variables. The policy rate
declines and the real GDP and inflation both increase initially. The difference is
in the amplitude of the disturbances caused by the foreign interest rate shock.
The deviation of the policy rate is stronger than in the Simple model, but
smaller than in the Benchmark model. While the deviation of real GDP is less
pronounced than in the Simple model but higher than in the Benchmark model.
Two effects are at work in the Chinese model, on one hand the financial
accelerator and on the other hand the dampening effect of required reserves. The
financial accelerator amplifies the disturbance of the real economy from the
change in the central bank’s balance, hence the deviation of real GDP is higher
than in the Benchmark model. Required reserves counteract this effect to a
degree, while their implementation also increases the deviation of the policy rate.
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7 Monetary policy reform
This section explores the impact policy reform has on the responses to a
depreciation of the foreign interest rate. It builds on the Chinese model described
above. Three different scenarios are considered, capital account liberalization,
the implementation of a floating exchange rate and the joint implementation of
an open capital account and a floating exchange rate. 178
7.1 Capital account reform with imperfect capital mobility
The first scenario of policy reform to be explored is one where the capital
account is opened, while the fixed nominal exchange rate regime remains. Under
the trilemma of monetary policy this reform would imply that the domestic
country would have no monetary autonomy. Given perfect capital mobility,
arbitrage would enforce a synchronization of domestic and foreign interest rates.
With a continuation of the exchange rate peg the uncovered interest parity
condition states that domestic and foreign interest rates are identical. Such that
Rt = R
?
t would hold for all periods of the simulation.
179
It is however assumed, that even after reform the central bank does retain an
interest in monetary autonomy. Such that the stability of the domestic policy
rate remains one of the main targets of monetary policy. As observed by
Aizenman180, the central bank’s foreign assets holdings can serve as a cushion to
mitigate the effect of terms-of trade shocks on the domestic economy. In
consequence there is an incentive for the central bank to maintain some level of
sterilization. With sterilization, which serves as a mechanism to control capital
flows, the central bank creates room for some degree of monetary autonomy.
Autonomy that results in the possibility of deviating from the identity between
foreign interest rate and the domestic policy rate.181
The outlined scenario does not reflect on the implications of so called hot money,
which describes the influx of foreign investments on the domestic financial
markets fueled by expectations of exchange rate appreciation and interest rate
differentials. Foreign investors are outside of the model’s scope. Accordingly all
foreign assets are held by either the central bank or domestic private entities and
all domestic bonds are held by domestic entities. This limitation is also found in
Chang et al.. In consequence the opening of the capital account is integrated in a
relatively one-sided manner, that is deemed sufficient to answer the question of
178the scenarios are the same as in Chang et al. (2012), p.19-23
179Chang et al. (2012), p.19-23
180Aizenman (2008), p.490-491
181Chang et al. (2012), p.19-23
80
the validity of a chosen path of monetary policy reform.182
A Implementing an open capital account
The Chinese model described above has two agents that can hold domestic
bonds. The banker households and the commercial banks. It is assumed that
only the commercial banks have access to the foreign financial markets, whereas
the bankers are restricted to domestic bonds. This restriction eliminates the
necessity to introduce an additional first order condition for the optimization of
the bankers. Additionally it is maintained, that the bankers’ investment in bonds
is constant, such that their bond investment is not present in the log-linearized
state of the model.
Overall investment in foreign assets is bound to the following additional
equilibrium condition,
B?t = B
?
g,t +B
?
j,t (115)
where B?g,t is the central bank’s share of foreign assets and B
?
j,t is the commercial
banks’ share.
Commercial banks invest their acquired capital in foreign assets and central bank
bonds. Accordingly bank capital is defined as St ≡ Gj,t + tB?j,t, where Gj,t are
the central bank bonds held by the commercial banks. They invest with the goal
to maximize the earnings from their investment. In a scenario where foreign
assets and central bank bonds are perfect substitutes this would be a binary
choice, banks would always invest all bank capital into the asset with higher
interest. With adjustment costs this is no longer the case as changes to the
composition of the investment portfolio generate additional costs. Accordingly
the commercial banks maximize the interest earned from their investment
portfolio by choosing the optimal portfolio share of central bank bonds. This
optimization is subject to the adjustment costs. The portfolio share of central
bank bonds is given by the equation below.183
∂t =
Gj,t
Gj,t + tB?j,t
(116)
where ∂t is the portfolio share.
The quadratic adjustment costs are given by the equation below
Ωx
2
(
Gj,t
Gj,t + tB?j,t
− ∂¯
)2
St (117)
182Chang et al. (2012), p.23-25
183Chang et al. (2012), p.20
81
where Ωx are the average portfolio adjustment costs and ∂¯ is the steady-state
portfolio share.
The commercial banks maximize their gains according to the equation given
below, where τ ‡j,t are the gains from investment.
max τ ‡j,t = $j,tSj,t −
Ωx
2
(
Gj,t
Gj,t + tB?j,t
− ∂¯
)2
St (118)
the term $j,tSj,t is the interest earned from the portfolio held by the individual
bank and is defined by
$j,tSj,t ≡ RtGj,t + tR?tB?j,t (119)
Given the definition of bank capital above, the nominal marginal interest on
bank capital can be expressed as
$t = Rt
Gj,t
Gj,t + tB?j,t
+R?t
tB
?
j,t
Gj,t + tB?j,t
(120)
which can be transformed into
$t = ∂tRt + (1− ∂t)R?t (121)
Bank capital and total interest are then substituted by their definitions into the
maximization problem
max τ ‡j,t = RtGj,t+R
?
t tB
?
j,t−
Ωx
2
(
Gj,t
Gj,t + tB?j,t
− ∂¯
)2
Gj,t−Ωx
2
(
Gj,t
Gj,t + tB?j,t
− ∂¯
)2
tB
?
j,t
(122)
Deriving the first order conditions for foreign assets and central bank bonds and
combining them yields the following condition for the optimal portfolio share in
the symmetric equilibrium
Rt − tR?t = (1− t)
Ωx
2
(
∂t − ∂¯
)2
(123)
The marginal interest on bank capital replaces the interest on central bank bonds
in the marginal loan creation cost function, yielding the following equation
V ‡t = R
•
t − θζζt +
(
R◦t −$t − (R‡t − 1)
(L‡ − Lt)
L‡
)
1
Lt
(124)
Since the foreign assets are split between the commercial banks and the central
bank, the foreign assets are replaced by the share of foreign assets held by the
central bank in the central bank’s flow of funds budget constraint
t
(
B?g,t −R?t−1B?g,t−1
)
= Mt −Mt−1 +Gt −Rt−1Gt−1 + θζ (Dt − ζtDt−1) (125)
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B Parameter calibration and steady-state
The simulation follows Chang et al. in the choice of the average adjustment costs
of the banks’ portfolio and the steady-state presets for the new variables.184
Accordingly the average costs are set to Ωx = 0.22. The portfolio share of central
bank bonds in the steady-state is set to ∂¯ = 0.9. Another important ratio for the
steady-state is the share of foreign assets held by the banking sector. This is
defined by ∂? ≡ B?j,t
B?t
and is set to ∂? = 0.55. With these parameters and presets,
a numerical solution can be found, that is used as the steady-state in the
simulation of the model.
C Simulation results and variance comparison
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Figure 12: IRF of policy variables after a persistent foreign interest rate shock,
Chinese model without (black) and with an open capital account (red)
184Chang et al. (2012), p.22
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Figure (12) shows the IRF of the target variables to a one percent decline of the
foreign interest rate. The initial effects of the decline of the foreign interest rate
are similar to the previous simulations. With a significant difference, the
propagation of the depreciation of the foreign interest rate into the domestic
economy no longer depends on the existence of a policy weight on the foreign
assets to GDP ratio. The portfolio readjustment of the banks following the
depreciation operates as a second channel for the propagation of the foreign
interest shock. The reversal of the interest rate differential changes the optimal
portfolio configuration and leads to a sharp initial decline of foreign assets held
by the commercial banks. Forcing the central bank to intervene. With the weight
on the total foreign assets to GDP ratio, a sharp reduction of foreign assets by
the banks causes welfare losses for the central bank. Accordingly the central
bank initially increases its foreign asset holdings despite the less favorable
interest rate differential. Which remarkably coupled with growing export demand
leads to a growth of the current account surplus in the initial period.
The decline of the foreign interest rate increases the cost of sterilization, leading
to a reduction of central bank bonds and a decrease of the domestic policy rate.
Since foreign assets held by the central bank are not reduced, this triggers an
expansion of the money supply to balance the flow of funds budget. The
optimization of the Ramsey function leads to an initial increase of the money
supply growth rate. An increase that is significantly smaller than in the
simulation with a closed capital account. The money supply growth rate varies
by 0.13% in comparison to the variance of 0.45% in the simulation with a closed
capital account.
The expansionary impulse generated by this expansion of the money supply has
in consequence much less of an impact on the domestic economy than in previous
iterations. The reduction of central bank bonds by the central bank is reflected
in a decline of bank capital and bank leverage. Banks reduce both their central
bank bond and their foreign asset holdings, though the reduction in foreign
assets is significantly stronger. This is evident in the variances. Central bank
bonds vary by 0.02% while foreign assets held by the banks vary by 5.06%.
Financial sector interest rates decline in line with the decrease of the domestic
policy rate. Leading to an adjustment of the leverage ratio and a reduction of
credit in the economy.
Investment contracts initially. This contraction was present when the capital
account was closed, it is a reflection of the declining demand for capital in the
post-initial period. Capital used in the next period must be created in the initial
period. The expansionary impulse generated by the smaller initial intervention is
overridden by the contraction of investment. The expansionary impulse is not
strong enough to push the economy towards an initial expansion. It is observable
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from the IRF of real GDP and output, that it has an initially mitigating effect on
the contraction suffered by the domestic economy. The reduction in investment
suppresses the real price for capital and the marginal cost for the retail good.
The forward looking nature of capital acquisition implies that the initial
reduction in output cannot be compensated initially by a reduction in capital
usage. Accordingly the reduction in output translates into a reduction of the
usage of the intermediate good. Which results in a lower demand for labor and a
reduction in wages, coupled with a reduction of consumption by the worker
households.
Inflation decreases initially, leading to an increase in the real exchange rate. This
increase in the real exchange rate in turn leads to a decline in imports and a
growth in export demand.
The current account contracts after the initial period, when the one period lag of
the foreign interest rate affects the calculation of earnings from foreign assets
included in the current account. With the decline of the current account the
central bank starts to reduce its foreign asset position, as the reversed interest
rate differential causes losses for the central bank. As the shock on the foreign
interest rates fades out of the simulation, commercial banks readjust their
portfolios and reapproach the steady-state distribution. In turn the model moves
back to its steady-state configuration.
7.2 Floating exchange rate
The next reform considered is the implementation of a floating nominal exchange
rate. As in Chang et al., the central bank lifts the exchange rate peg but
maintains capital controls.185
A Implementing a floating exchange rate
The first step in introducing the floating exchange rate into the Chinese model is
to add a variable that defines the growth rate of the nominal exchange rate. It is
given by γt ≡ tt−1 , where γt is the growth rate.186 Since the capital account
remains closed, the exchange rate cannot be bound to the interest rate
differential, uncovered interest parity is not enforced. Accordingly the nominal
anchor for the exchange rate must be provided by different means. Chang et al.
solve this by applying an unspecified money growth rule as a nominal anchor for
the exchange rate. 187
185Chang et al. (2012), p.23
186Chang et al. (2012), p.13
187Chang et al. (2012), p.24
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Richard C. K. Burdekin and Pierre L. Siklos, propose a money demand equation
for Mainland China. In this equation they establish money supply as the sum of
the consumer price index, real GDP and the benchmark deposit lending rate set
by the central bank, given a set of constants attached to each variable.188 The
equation is as follows,
lnMt = ϑpi ln Πt + ϑgdp lnGDP t + ϑrΞt + ϑ (126)
where ϑpi, ϑgdp, ϑr and ϑ are constants. Burdekin and Siklos then use empirical
analysis to estimate the values of the different constants.189
This estimated equation forms the basis for the implementation of a nominal
anchor for the nominal exchange rate in the present paper. For this the money
supply is replaced with the change of the nominal exchange rate and the
benchmark deposit lending rate is replaced with the policy interest rate. The
log-linear version of this modified money demand function used in the actual
simulation is shown below. The equation uses the log-linear form of the model
variables.
ˆt = ˆt−1 − 1.54pˆit − 1.35 ˆgdpt + 0.06rˆt (127)
Which establishes, that the log-linear deviation from the steady-state of the
nominal exchange rate is negatively related to the deviations from the
steady-state of inflation and GDP and positively related to the deviations of the
policy rate. This nominal anchor was chosen in particular as the results of the
simulation of the benchmark model using this equation are similar in motion to
the simulation results of Chang et al..190
Given that the change of the nominal exchange rate is no longer one, the
definition of the real exchange rate must be updated. This provides the avenue
for changes in the nominal exchange rate to affect the real economy. The
updated equation is given by:
Qt
Qt−1
= γt
pixt
pit
(128)
B Simulation results
Figure (13) shows the IRF of the target variables to a one percent decline of the
foreign interest rate. As the capital account is again closed, the propagation of
the decline of the foreign interest rate into the domestic economy depends on the
existence of a policy weight on the foreign asset to GDP ratio, similar to the
188Burdekin and Siklos (2008), p.856
189Burdekin and Siklos (2008), p.856
190Chang et al. (2012), p.13
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Figure 13: IRF of policy variables after a persistent foreign interest rate shock,
Chinese model with fixed exchange rate (black) and floating exchange rate (blue)
Chinese model with a fixed nominal exchange rate. Different to the fixed nominal
exchange rate scenario, foreign assets do not deviate from their steady-state
value in the initial period. What deviates though are central bank bonds, which
decline initially. This initial decline is matched with an intervention by the
central bank, that leads to an initial increase in the money supply. According to
the variances this intervention is similar in force to the intervention in the fixed
nominal exchange rate simulation, the money supply growth rate varies by
0.45%. This is coupled with a significantly smaller variance for the central bank
bonds, which vary by 0.92%.
The increase in the money supply provides an expansionary impulse, which
translates to an increase in consumption by the banker households. This increase
in consumption is in turn strong enough to override the contraction of
investment and to push for an increase in aggregate demand. Which, given that
export demand remains stable initially, leads to an economic expansion. The
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increase in output drives factor demand, leading to a higher initial demand for
the intermediate good. Since capital used in the initial period is acquired in the
preceding period, it cannot be adjusted to reflect the increase in factor demand
in the initial period.
The marginal cost for the retail good decline, in line with a decline in domestic
inflation. This initial disinflation is reflected in the decline of wage inflation and
a less pronounced reduction in real wages. The reduction in real wages, in turn,
reduces the income available to the worker households and results in a decline in
the workers’ consumption.
The initial disinflation is not transmitted to the real exchange rate initially,
which remains at its steady-state level in the initial period. This is a result of the
sharp decline of the nominal exchange growth rate, which neutralizes the impact
of the disinflation on the real exchange rate. In correlation with the real
exchange rate export demand too remains stable. In other iterations, the decline
in the real exchange rate was enhancing economic growth by reducing the price
for the import good, allowing for a dampening of the increase of marginal costs
for the intermediate good despite the increase in wages. In the present scenario
this effect does not occur, which reduces the expansionary effect of the central
bank intervention.
The graph for the current account surplus again resembles a check-mark, it
reaches its lowest point after the initial period. The steepest decline is after the
initial period, when the one period lag of the foreign interest rate affects the
calculation of earnings from foreign assets included in the current account. This
is also the point when the trend of the domestic economy reverses. The changed
interest rate differential causes losses for the central bank and forces a reduction
of the central bank’s foreign asset holdings. This decline in the foreign asset
holdings is coupled with a reduction in the money supply. Consumption declines,
as the reduced earnings from lending capital and the slowly rising demand for
bank capital cause a decline in banker’s consumption. The economy enters a
period of economic contraction. Overall consumption declines as lower output
suppresses wages further. The nominal exchange rate appreciates, the relative
value of the domestic currency falls. This increase in the nominal exchange rate
overrides the effect that rising inflation would have on the real exchange rate and
instead leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This increases the
export demand, and raises the costs for imports. Declining imports, rising
exports and the growing real value of foreign assets together with the waning of
the foreign interest rate shock lead to a return of the current account surplus to
steady-state levels.
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7.3 Floating exchange rate and capital account liberalization
The last scenario examined is one where the exchange rate regime and the
capital account are both reformed. The simulation is done with a modification of
the Chinese model, where the floating exchange rate and the capital account
liberalization are implemented.
Accordingly the model used for the simulation is one that contains the opened
capital account as described above and the nominal floating exchange rate tied to
a money supply growth rule. Since the nominal exchange rate was a constant in
the simulation with the capital account liberalization, the log-linear equation
governing the optimal portfolio share for commercial banks takes now the
following form.
r¯rˆt − r¯xrˆxt = Ωx ∗ ∂¯∂ˆt + γ¯eγˆe (129)
As the nominal exchange rate is assumed to be constant in the steady state, the
steady-state growth of the exchange rate is set to γ¯e = 1.
A Simulation results
As before, figure (14) captures the IRF of the target variables to a one percent
decline of the foreign interest rate. The decline of the foreign interest rate leads
to a reduction in earnings from holding foreign assets. These reduced earnings
lead to a reduction of the share of foreign assets held in the investment portfolio
of the commercial banks. The foreign asset holdings of the central bank initially
increase, which stabilizes the overall holdings of foreign assets at their
steady-state level in the initial period. Central bank bonds and the domestic
policy rate decline initially. The effect of this decline on the central bank’s flow
of funds budget is enhanced by the reduction in required reserves precipitated by
the reduction in deposit demand. Deposit demand declines in line with bank
capital and bank leverage. The overall deviation from the steady-state of these
variables is less pronounced than in the simulation without liberalization. Central
bank bonds vary by 0.01%, deposits by 2.92% and bank leverage varies by 0.02%.
The minimization of the Ramsey function triggers an initial expansion of the
money supply growth rate. An intervention that is significantly less forceful than
in the simulation without full liberalization, the variance of the money supply
growth rate does not exceed 0.13%. This less pronounced intervention creates an
expansionary impulse and increases bankers’ consumption. Similar to the
simulation with an open capital account, the impulse though is not strong
enough, to supersede the initial economic contraction following the decline in
investment and aggregate demand.
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Figure 14: IRF of policy variables after a persistent foreign interest rate shock,
unreformed Chinese model (black) and full liberalization (violet)
Since the capital used in the current period has been bought in the previous
period, the change in factor demand due to the contraction is pushed upon the
intermediate good. Accordingly demand for the intermediate good declines. In
consequence labor demand and imports are reduced. This leads to a decline in
the real wage, which is mitigated by a depreciation of wage inflation. Lower
wages result in a reduction in consumption by the worker households superseding
the expansion of bankers’ consumption and forcing aggregate consumption to
contract.
The floating nominal exchange rate disassociates the development of the real
exchange rate somewhat from the development of domestic inflation, meaning
that the initial stabilization of inflation and the subsequent rise in inflation is
pushing the real exchange rate to decline. Accordingly export demand remains
stable and the price for the import good does not decline initially. This is
coupled with an initial increase in the nominal exchange rate growth rate.
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The lag on the foreign interest in calculating the current account surplus again
causes the steepest decline of the surplus to occur after the initial period. This
decline in the surplus deepens the economic contraction. The recession deepens
before the increase in exports and the fading out of the foreign interest rate
shock gradually restore the current account surplus and in turn return the
economy on its steady-state level. A factor in the deepening of the economic
contraction is the rearrangement of the commercial bank’s portfolio. The
distribution of shares in the portfolio is dependent on the real values and not on
the development of the interest rates. This causes a short lived stabilization of
the portfolio on the steady-state level after the initial period, which reduces the
earnings from the portfolio and raises the loan creation costs.
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Part IV
Conclusion
The concluding chapter is divided in three sections. The first section is dedicated
to a discussion of the limitations of the analysis presented in the present thesis.
The second section uses the variances of the endogenous policy target variables
to assess the shock responses in each model iteration on a numerical basis. The
final section of the chapter provides a review of the findings gathered in this
thesis and an assessment of the impact of frictions in financial intermediation on
the sustainability of the Chinese monetary policy stance in the light of a foreign
interest rate shock.
8 Discussion of limitations
Limitations for the validity of the observations provided by this work originate
mainly from three different sources: Necessary assumptions, specificity and scope.
Necessary assumptions are assumptions taken in the configuration of the models
that are necessary for the simulation to work, but that are design choices by the
author, which are naturally debatable. The most tenuous of these assumption is
certainly the introduction of a central bank target for the foreign asset to GDP
ratio. It is crucially important for the simulation to obtain a transmission of the
foreign interest shock into the domestic economy, beyond the current account
surplus. But it is not a common assumption in DSGE modeling, and there is no
PBoC announcement or such specifically declaring the target as a goal of Chinese
monetary policy. The discussion of the Quadratic Ramsey Function in Part II
provides the reasoning for its inclusion by the author.
Another point for debate is the design choice for the implementation of the
financial sector and the construction of the different interest rates. While these
are derived from published research and implemented with the goal to resemble
the Chinese financial sector, there are certainly alternative configurations and
designs that may have provided different results.
Specificity is meant to capture the fact, that the simulation results are
necessarily dependent on the choice of the values for parameters and weights.
The parameters chosen and the rational behind the choice for each parameter is
given in the description of the different models, underlying all choices is the
attempt to represent the Chinese economy. The most prominent example of this
specificity can again be found in the Quadratic Ramsey Policy Function. The
choice of the weights for the four policy targets of the central bank attributes a
hierarchy of importance to the different policy goals. Changes to these weights
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also fundamentally change the simulation results, especially the variances of the
policy target variables. Different values for the weights would lead to a different
assessment of the welfare impact of a foreign interest rate shock in each model
iteration.
Lastly the analysis faces limitations due to its scope. There are aspects of
financial intermediation and the Chinese economy in general, that are not within
the scope of the present thesis. One simplification is that the government is
represented only by the central bank in the models. Accordingly government
intervention, and specifically the stimulus program by the Chinese government
are outside of the scope of this work. Another simplification is that the required
reserves ratio is implemented as a constant rather than as an endogenous
variable that could be adjusted following the foreign interest rate shock. This
dynamic adjustment is outside of the scope of this work, as well as foreign direct
investment and foreign investors on domestic financial markets. Another part
that is not included is the interbank market, which could be an interesting field
for further research, given the liquidity fluctuations on the market.
9 Variance based comparison
This section uses the variances of endogenous variables to compare the impact of
the negative foreign interest rate shock in the different model iterations. First for
the Benchmark, Simple and Chinese model and secondly for the different steps of
monetary policy reform.191
9.1 Benchmark, Simple and Chinese model
The variances of the endogenous variables after a foreign interest shock can be
used as a venue for the comparison of the different model configurations. With
the advantage that this provides numerical measures, which are straightforward
to compare between the different models. Such comparison is deemed possible, as
all model iterations and steady-states are derived from the same benchmark
model. Accordingly it is assumed, that differences in the variances can be
attributed to the innovations introduced in each iteration.
In each model iteration there are four policy targets held by the central bank: to
minimize the deviation from the steady-state for the policy interest rate,
domestic inflation, real GDP and the foreign assets to GDP ratio. Each of these
variables has a weight attributed to it. These weights indicate the importance
the minimization of each variable’s deviation has for the central bank. All
191Chang et al. (2012), p.25
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Iteration Policy Rate Inflation GDP FX Ratio Welfare Loss
Benchmark 0.55 0.02 0.09 0.70 1.36
Simple 0.09 0.00 0.74 0.45 1.28
Simple no admin. 0.12 0.00 0.86 0.46 1.44
Chinese 0.24 0.01 0.51 0.4 1.11
Chinese no req. 0.12 0.01 0.79 0.49 1.41
Chinese 25% req. 0.33 0.01 0.27 0.42 1.03
Table 7: Comparison of the aggregated weighted variances of policy rate, inflation,
real GDP and foreign asset to GDP ratio 193
iterations use the same weights for the policy targets. These weights guide the
minimization introduced by the Ramsey Function.
The weighted deviation of a policy variable that occurs after the minimization is
taken as a loss for the central bank. The sum of all weighted losses incurred by
the central bank from deviations of the policy variables from the steady-state, is
taken as the overall welfare loss that the central bank incurs as the result of a
foreign interest rate shock in a given model iteration.192 The deviation from the
steady-state is the variance of a variable. Accordingly the variances of the policy
target variables weighted with the policy weights are used to assess the loss
incurred by the central bank. When comparing the overall welfare loss incurred
in the different model iterations it is assumed, that a higher loss signifies a
configuration that is less resilient towards foreign interest rate shocks.
The overall welfare loss is calculated by a simple addition of the weighted
variances of the policy target variables. Table (7) displays the weighted variances
for the policy targets as well as the overall welfare loss for each model iteration.
As in the simulation by Chang et al. the main contributors to the welfare loss for
the central bank in the benchmark model are the high variance of the domestic
policy rate and the foreign assets to GDP ratio.194
Comparatively, the variance of the domestic policy rate and the foreign assets to
GDP ratio are lower when financial frictions are implemented into the model.
This is likely a result of the changed anchoring of the liabilities of the central
bank’s flow of funds budget in the domestic economy. Central bank bonds are no
192Adopted from Chang et al. (2012), p.25-26
193In this figure the weighted variances are multiplied by 100 for display purposes. (Benchmark)
stands for the Benchmark model, (Simple) is the Simple model, (Simple no admin.) is the
Simple model without proportional administration costs, (Chinese) is the Chinese model with
10% required reserves, (Chinese no req.) is the Chinese model without required reserves and
(Chinese 25% req.) is the Chinese model with required reserves of 25%
194Chang et al. (2012), p.17-18
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longer held directly by the labor providing households, but by commercial banks
and bankers instead. The banking sector transmits the policy interest rate
change to the domestic economy, amplifying the change through the financial
accelerator. The higher impact of a change of the policy interest rate on the
domestic banking sector and the stronger effect of a decline of central bank
bonds affect the optimization of the central bank. This higher impact results in a
less steep initial increase in the domestic money supply growth rate. This less
forceful initial intervention is accompanied by a higher disturbance of the real
economy. Figure(7) highlights that this change in the variances results in a
decrease in the overall aggregated welfare loss, if proportional deposit
administration costs of 0.05% are taken into account. The proportional costs
have an offsetting effect. The lower proportional costs incurred as the result of a
decline of the stock of deposits, offset partly the reduction of deposit interest
rates due to the declining policy interest rate. Deposit rates are higher than they
would be without proportional costs. In the absence of administration costs the
disturbance of the real economy is even more pronounced and the aggregated
welfare loss surpasses the loss incurred in the simulation of the benchmark model.
The Simple model without administration costs and the Chinese model with
required reserves of 0% are very similar in their distribution of variances and the
overall welfare loss. Which is intended as there is very little difference between
these models. The impact of the administration costs on the deposit rate is
significantly reduced in the Chinese model due to the introduction of deposit rate
mandates.
The comparison changes when looking at the simulations of the Chinese model
with a required reserves ratio of 10% and 25%. The effect by which the required
reserves reduce the impact of monetary shocks on the real economy is visible in
the variance of real GDP. It is lower when required reserves are implemented and
the reduction scales with the required reserves ratio. It also shows the trade-off
the central bank faces when implementing required reserves. While the variance
of real GDP drops and the variance of the foreign asset ratio is fairly stable, the
variance of the policy rate increases with higher required reserve ratios. This is
coupled with a higher initial increase in the money supply than in the Simple
model. The strength of the initial increase in the money supply scales with the
required reserves ratio.
The amplifying effect frictions in financial intermediation have on the
disturbance the real economy suffers from monetary shocks is a common finding
in frictions research.195 The dampening effect of macroprudential regulation,
specifically minimum reserve requirements, has also been described in economic
195for example Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), p.379-380
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Iteration Policy rate Inflation GDP Foreign asset ratio Loss
Chinese 0.24 0.01 0.51 0.4 1.11
Open 0.04 0.01 0.39 0.13 0.57
Float 0.47 0.09 0.01 0.41 0.98
Complete 0.21 0.07 0.01 0.15 0.44
Table 8: Comparison of the aggregated weighted variances of policy rate, inflation,
real GDP and foreign asset to GDP ratio
research.196 That these two effects in turn shape the scope and scale of monetary
policy interventions is visible in the variances of the policy variables and the
changes to the initial increase of the money supply between the different model
configurations. The policy target weights used in the simulations emphasize the
importance of policy rate smoothing and price stability over disturbances to the
real GDP and the foreign asset to GDP ratio. In the context of these weights,
variance comparison shows that the effects of frictions, required reserves and
deposit rate mandates have a positive impact on the welfare loss incurred in the
event of a foreign interest rate shock. The overall welfare loss is lower than in the
benchmark model, and the Chinese model with required reserves has the lowest
welfare loss.
A significant role for the credit channel in policy transmission (financial
accelerator), required reserves and interest rate mandates, are key characteristics
of the Chinese monetary policy framework, as it existed during the worldwide
financial crisis. The variance comparison shows that these characteristics have an
impact on the response to foreign interest rate shocks. The disturbance of
monetary policy targets by foreign interest rate shocks is less severe. This
suggests, that the framework of the Chinese monetary policy and the Chinese
financial sector grant a higher resilience towards foreign interest rate shocks.
9.2 Variance effects of policy reform
Table (8) compares the weighted variances of the different steps of policy reform.
All simulations use a required reserves ratio of 10%.
The table shows, that the welfare loss varies strongly between the different steps
of reform. Implementing an open capital account almost halves the aggregated
welfare loss. While the reduction achieved through a floating nominal exchange
rate is less pronounced. A complete reform, opening the capital account and
floating the nominal exchange rate, results in the lowest welfare loss.
196Dib (2010), p.30
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The variances show, that the model with an open capital account shows a strong
decrease of the variance of the policy rate and the foreign assets to GDP ratio.
As commercial banks are allowed to hold foreign assets, they can react to the
decline in the foreign interest rate without the constraints put upon the central
bank. Compared to the capital account liberalization, the variance of the policy
rate is significantly higher when only a floating nominal exchange rate is
implemented. The variance of real GDP on the other hand is drastically smaller.
Under a complete reform, the variance of the policy rate is similar to the variance
in the Chinese model, whereas the variance of inflation and real GDP are close to
the model with a floating nominal exchange rate. The variance of the foreign
assets to GDP ratio is comparable to the model with an open capital account.
As described by Chang et al., the lower losses in scenarios with an open capital
account are a result of the costs of sterilization.197 While costly sterilization
persists in a scenario with a floating nominal exchange rate and a closed capital
account, this is not the case when the capital account is opened. Opening the
capital account eliminates the costs of sterilization, expressed in a lower variance
of the policy rate.198
Accordingly policy reform should focus primarily on the removal of capital
controls. This would eliminate the biggest constraint to an optimal central bank
policy, costly sterilization. While the sterilization costs are negative in the
steady-state equilibrium, sterilizing foreign assets with domestic central bank
bonds provides a benefit to the government, this reverses after the foreign
interest rate shock. Sterilization becomes costly.199 This is reflected in realty,
where the financial crisis suppressed US-Libor and EURIBOR interest rates
below their Mainland Chinese counterparts.
197Chang et al. (2012), p.25-26
198Chang et al. (2012), p.25
199Chang et al. (2012), p.26
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10 Concluding remarks
By introducing financial frictions into a model with Chinese characteristics this
paper provides a frame of reference for the impact of financial frictions on the
sustainability of Chinese monetary policy in the advent of a negative foreign
interest rate shock. The models are build on the model with Chinese
characteristics published by Chang et al. and on the setup for the
implementation of financial frictions provided by Ali Dib.200 The calibration of
the parameters and the initial steady-state is informed by Chinese economic data
for the period between 2008 and 2012.
Financial intermediation matters. The simulations demonstrate that frictions in
financial intermediation have a significant impact on responses to a foreign
interest rate shock, under the assumptions and axioms underlying this paper. In
the models, intermediation and the frictions in the channeling of funds by the
financial sector act as a stabilizing force in the event of a negative foreign interest
rate shock. They reduce the impact of this persistent shocks on the fulfillment of
domestic monetary policy targets. This effect occurs despite the amplifying effect
that the frictions in financial intermediation have on the impact of shocks on the
real economy. The variance of real GDP is significantly higher when financial
intermediation is implemented. Accordingly the stabilizing effect of financial
frictions is dependent on the choice of policy weights. With the weights chosen in
this paper, which favor policy rate stability and stable inflation over changes to
the real GDP, the higher variance in real GDP is outweighed by the strong
decrease in the variance of the nominal policy rate. In consequence the loss
incurred by the central bank in the event of a negative foreign interest rate shock
is reduced when financial intermediation is taken into account. Taking the
deviation of the policy rate from its target as a measure of domestic monetary
autonomy, it can be stated that monetary autonomy is enhanced when financial
intermediation is included in the models.
Ma Guonan describes in a paper from 2011, how the use of the required reserves
ratio as a tool of sterilization reduces the costs of sterilization for the central
bank. This can be seen as a shifting of the cost of sterilization from the central
bank onto the shoulders of the financial intermediates.201 Implementing required
reserves and simulating the resulting model with different required reserves ratios
yields a similar observation. The welfare loss incurred by the model’s central
bank decreases with higher required reserves ratios. And as mentioned by Ma,
there also appears to be a possible turning point, where the negative effects of
the ratio start to outweigh the positive effects. In the simulation, required
200Chang et al. (2012) and Dib (2010)
201Ma et al. (2011), especially p.6
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reserves reduce the overall welfare loss by decreasing the volatility of the real
economy. In line with the observation of Ali Dib, required reserves act as a shield
that lessens the impact of the negative foreign interest rate shock on the real
economy.202 The implementation of required reserves in the models reduces the
variance of real GDP, a reduction that scales with the height of the required
reserves ratio. Required reserves on the other hand also generate a scalable
increase in the variance of the nominal policy rate, higher ratios cause a higher
variance. This may eventually outweigh the reduction in the variance of real
GDP, given the preference for a stable policy rate. Implying that apart from the
impact of higher ratios on the financial sector and its profitability, there is also a
limit to the ratio from an optimal monetary policy standpoint. The volatility of
the nominal policy rate is one of the limitations of the models, the simulations do
not capture the full scope of the management of financial market interest rates
implemented by the Chinese central bank. Accordingly the nominal policy rate is
more volatile than the Chinese nominal policy rate. The central bank would
most likely not implement changes through a change of the policy rate, but by an
adjustment of the benchmark rates.
Chen et al. state in their conclusion, that the current Chinese non-conventional
monetary policy toolbox represents a work of art.203 The unique toolbox for the
conduct of monetary policy and the configuration of financial markets in China
interact and influence each other. They create a situation where despite the
persistence of current account surpluses, the cost of sterilization remains
manageable for the central bank. Partially by creating a situation where the
financial sector carries some of the costs. Through this setup the chosen
monetary policy path gains sustainability. A sustainability that a monetary
framework with a closed capital account and fixed exchange rate but without the
specific Chinese characteristics wouldn’t be able to replicate. This higher
sustainability is expressed by a higher resilience to a negative foreign interest
rate shock. In consequence China can be assumed to have a greater ability to
cope with outside disturbances than other countries with similarly closed capital
accounts and fixed exchange rates by virtue of the specific characteristics of
financial intermediation and macroprudential regulation in Mainland China.
This though does not suggest that the Chinese model is better equipped to
absorb a negative foreign interest rate shock, than a monetary policy with an
open capital account and a floating exchange rate. By implementing monetary
policy liberalization into the model it can be shown that the disturbance suffered
by a completely liberalized monetary policy is by far smaller than the
disturbance suffered by the replication of the current Chinese monetary policy.
202Dib (2010), p.29-30
203Chen et al. (2012), p.27
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In these findings the simulations replicate the results found by Chang et al., that
suggest that a complete liberalization is the optimal path of monetary reform.204
The greatest difference is caused by the liberalization of the capital account. The
response of the financial sector to a change in the interest rate differential vastly
reduces the scope of central bank intervention. This is in line with observations
from a paper published by Sebastian Edwards in 2011.205
With the growing integration of China into international trade and the recent
push of the government to establish the Renminbi as a currency of international
impact, a reform of the Chinese monetary policy seems inevitable in the long
run, yet the interaction between financial intermediation and monetary policy in
Mainland China may provide more resilience to the status quo in the short-run.
204Chang et al. (2012), p.26-27
205Edwards (2011), p.10
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Figure 15: schematic benchmark model
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Figure 16: Benchmark model IRF of other variables after a persistent foreign
interest rate shock
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Figure 17: schematic simple model
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Figure 18: Simple model IRF of other variables after a persistent foreign interest
rate shock
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C Chinese model
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Figure 19: schematic Chinese model
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bˆt = dˆt (239)
bˆ = ˆ`t + sˆt (240)
rˆ•t = θmΞˆt + (1− θm)
(
r¯rˆt − χd¯dˆt
)
(241)
rˆ‡t − rˆ‡t−1 =
θj
Ωj
(vˆ‡t − rˆ‡t ) + βEt(rˆ‡t+1 − rˆ‡t ) (242)
v¯‡vˆ‡t = r¯
•rˆ•t − θζ ζ¯ ζˆt
+1¯`
(
r¯◦rˆ◦t − r¯rˆt −
(
r¯‡ − 1) `‡−¯`
`‡
(
r¯‡
r¯‡−1 rˆ
‡
t +
¯`
`‡−¯`
ˆ`
t
)
+ ˆ`t
(
r¯◦ − r¯ − r¯‡ `‡−¯`
`‡
)) (243)
¯`
`‡
ˆ`
t = − `
‡
Ω`
(r¯‡ − 1)
s¯
(
r¯‡
r¯‡ − 1 rˆ
‡
t − sˆt
)
(244)
foreign country
xˆt = θ?qˆt + ˆ˜x
?
t (245)
Θ¯Θˆt = x¯xˆt− q¯y¯? (qˆt + yˆ?t )+ q¯
b¯?(r¯? − 1)
p¯i?ψ¯
(
qˆt + bˆ
?
t−1 +
r¯?
r¯? − 1 rˆ
?
t−1 − pˆi?t − ψˆt
)
(246)
central bank
Θ¯Θˆt = q¯b¯
?
(
bˆ?t + qˆt
(
1− 1
p¯i?ψ¯
)
− 1
p¯i?ψ¯
(
bˆ?t−1 − pˆi? − ψˆ
))
(247)
q¯b¯?
(
bˆ?t + qˆt
(
1− r¯?
p¯i?ψ¯
)
− r¯?
p¯i?ψ¯
(
bˆ?t−1 + rˆ
?
t−1 − pˆi?t − ψˆt
))
= m¯
(
mˆt − 1p¯iψ¯
(
mˆt−1 − pˆit − ψˆt
))
+ g¯
(
gˆt − r¯p¯iψ¯
(
gˆt−1 + rˆt−1 − pˆit − ψˆt
))
+θζ d¯
(
dˆt − ζ¯p¯iψ¯
(
ζˆt−1 + dˆt−1 − pˆit − ψˆt
)) (248)
mˆt = mˆt−1 + µˆt − pˆit − ψˆt (249)
Ξˆ = ρdrˆ
•
t−1 + (1− ρd)
(
r¯•
r¯
)(1−ρd)
rˆt (250)
ζˆt = ρζ ζˆt−1 + (1− ρζ)(rˆ − rˆt−1) (251)
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equilibrium conditions
c¯cˆt = c¯
•cˆ•t + c¯
◦cˆ◦t (252)
gˆt = sˆt (253)
y¯yˆt = c¯cˆt + x¯xˆt + i¯ˆit (254)
¯gdp ˆgdpt = c¯cˆt + x¯xˆt − q¯y¯?(qˆt + yˆ?t ) + i¯ˆit (255)
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Figure 20: IRF of other variables after a persistent foreign interest rate shock,
Chinese model (black), open capital account (red), floating exchange rate (blue)
and complete liberalization(violet)
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